The Arabian Gulf: the coming calamity

US pivot to the Pacific; Gulf kingdoms' ties with Israel; Iraqi and Afghan priorities; an Iranian-Chinese strategic partnership - all of these factors increase the likelihood of the US losing its dominance of the Arabian Gulf.

As with Iran in 1979, the United States once again faces the likelihood of losing a large portion of influence in the Middle-East.

The 1979 revolution did not happen by accident. By the late 1960's staunch US ally Britain was no longer willing to maintain its superpower status and made a strategic withdrawal from the global stage. To make up for Britain's absence, the US increasingly relied on the Shah of Iran to help it police the region. Unfortunately, core financial issues coupled with strong relations with Israel left Iran ripe for Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution and forced the Shah out of power.

Similarly to Britain 60 years ago, under Donald Trump the United States is looking to make a strategic withdrawal, particularly from the Middle-East and from Europe. At the same time, the US is focusing its military assets on the Pacific and ramping up pressure on adversaries China and Iran. While the US is certainly likely to prevent Chinese dominance in the Pacific, its simultaneous pressure on Iran and China gives both nations a timely opportunity for Middle-Eastern dominance.

Earlier this year a draft of a strategic partnership between China and Iran was leaked to the international press. If Donald Trump is reelected President, it is highly likely the two powers would implement the partnership and ignite Cold War 2 with the United States. In such a scenario, China would not need to invade Taiwan to defeat the US; instead, China would be able to apply sizeable pressure on the US in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and the Arabian Gulf through its partnership with Iran - to deadly effect.

Should China back Iran's efforts for Middle-Eastern dominance, there would be little that the Trump Administration would be able to do to stop them. Donald Trump was elected precisely because of public exasperation with military intervention in the Middle-East, and President Trump is beholden to that national mood. Only in Iraq and Afghanistan would President Trump be allowed to intervene militarily, and that because of the US' past sacrifices there. All of these factors create a considerable opening for Iran and China in the Arabian Gulf.

Unfortunately, the Trump Administration's strategy of bringing Gulf kingdoms and Israel together in its absence only increases the likelihood that China will acquire the Arabian Gulf. Israeli peace with the UAE and Bahrain certainly seems an historic achievement in the short term, but in the long term it brings a day of reckoning for neighbouring Saudi Arabia.

Mohammed Bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, serves as an almost identical case study to the Shah of Iran. MBS is autocratic, warm in his approach to Israel, not favoured by the religious establishment, facing economic uncertainty at home and is helping the US police the region. Israeli peace with the UAE and Bahrain certainly would not have happened without tacit approval from MBS; should he become king and also make peace with Israel, it is highly likely to backfire.

In few ways would this backfiring be more evident than with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia's close military ally. As China and the US have been carving up their spheres of influence, Saudi Arabia has drifted closer to the US, India and Israel, while Pakistan has found itself even more closely aligned with China. Should Saudi Arabia erupt in instability, it is likely that China and Iran would apply sizable pressure on Pakistan to renege on its military commitments to Saudi Arabia. Close Saudi ties with both India and Israel only increases the likelihood of Pakistani neutrality in the face of Saudi instability.

Should Arabia join the Chinese-Iranian sphere of influence, it would have a decisive impact on the region. Iraq would take Saudi Arabia's place as the foremost US regional priority after Israel, and driving Iran out of Iraq would become an even more urgent priority than it is today. After Israel and Iraq, Afghanistan would be the US' next highest priority, as through Afghanistan the US would be able to apply pressure on both Iran and Pakistan.

With China dominating Iran, Arabia and Pakistan, the Middle-East would become even more volatile and unpredictable. China would dominate both sides of the Arabian Gulf, and Iraq, Jordan and the smaller Gulf kingdoms would all be on the front line against an increasingly belligerent China.

Why the US will return to Afghanistan

As the United States continues to strategically relocate assets to the Pacific, China, Iran and the Taliban will move to take down the Afghan government. As with Iraq in 2014, the situation in Afghanistan will become so untenable that the United States will have no choice but to return.

The impending US withdrawal from Afghanistan is only temporary, and that because of China and Iran.

In defeating its strategic adversaries, the Trump Administration has proven itself effective. With Iran, the US has withdrawn from the 2015 nuclear deal and measured sanctions against the nation, as well as against its proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The US' top regional priority - apart from preventing Iran's nuclear capabilities - is to force Iran out of Iraq and to realign Iraq completely with US' interests, which is likely to be achieved in the long-term - but only if President Trump is reelected in November.

With China, the Trump Administration has backed up tough talk with tough actions. President Trump angered Beijing by calling Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen after his 2016 election win and has bolstered America's position in the South China Sea, with its Pacific allies and with Taiwan. While hostility between the US and China was largely contained to a trade war, the outbreak of Covid-19 now threatens to push the two superpowers to the brink of Cold War. If the two economies decouple and a Second Cold War ensues, it will bring several global hot spots to breaking point.

Nowhere is this more evident than Afghanistan. The Taliban and Afghan government are close to beginning negotiations, and if the Taliban play along, within 14 months the United States could completely withdraw from Afghanistan. While the United States is in Afghanistan it is unlikely the Taliban will push too far militarily - but once the Americans have withdrawn, the Taliban will fight to take down the Afghan government.

Adding China and Iran to the geopolitical calculus makes this outcome even more likely. In addition to sanctions, the assassination of Qassem Soleimani has humiliated and weakened Iran, and threatens its assets in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria as never before. China, too, is growing increasingly alarmed by the movement of US military and sanctions against it, and has touted a strategic partnership with Iran to counter the emerging US threat.

Should President Trump be reelected in November, China and Iran would move ahead on a strategic partnership and, after this, China would apply pressure on Tehran to unilaterally support the Afghan Taliban. Though a Salafi Sunni extremist group, the Taliban has been used at various times by Iran to send its message to the Afghan government and to the US. With a China-Iran strategic partnership sealed, Iran would be required by China to withdraw its support for the Afghan government, to force the United States' hand.

For the US and Afghanistan, Iran's appointment of Esmail Qaani as new Quds Force commander ought to serve as another clear warning. Esmail Qaani has a long history of funnelling Iranian weapons into Afghanistan for both the Taliban and the government - with Iran vowing vengeance against the US for assassinating Qassem Soleimani, Qaani's predecessor, supporting the Taliban to bring down the US allied government in Kabul would be one of the easiest ways to send that message.

For China and Iran, the benefits to US re-engagement with Afghanistan would be substantial. The Taliban is a security threat to both China and Iran - initially funding them to compel the US to return allows two of their enemies to be preoccupied with each other. It gives Iran and China more favourability with Pakistan; it gives the Trump Administration less room for military maneuver in support of Taiwan; it proves Iran is capable of striking back against the US for the death of Soleimani and, most importantly of all, it provides China and Iran with new opportunities for Middle-Eastern dominance.

President Trump is an unpredictable adversary - but one thing both Iran and China can count on is his America First approach. Both nations know that, after Iraq and Afghanistan, the American people would almost under no circumstances support another sizable Middle-Eastern war, and President Trump is beholden to that national mood. Worse still: because of the sacrifices already made in Iraq and Afghanistan, they remain foremost regional priority for the Trump Administration.

Lebanon is most immediately at risk. The current Lebanese ruling class are likely to be overthrown by the protesters; after this occurs Hezbollah, with Chinese and Iranian support, will sit in waiting for the right opportunity to take over the country. With the US occupied in Afghanistan and Iraq, only Israel would stand in the way of Hezbollah taking control of Lebanon.

On the other hand, if Saudi Arabia erupts in civil war, the United States would be unable to help and would be forced to rely on Egypt, the GCC and Israel to intervene in its stead. Should Mohammed Bin Salman be made king and also make rapprochement with Israel, there is a good chance Pakistan would stay neutral in a Saudi civil war. Pakistan is not only indebted to China and moving away from US influence; the strengthening Indian-Saudi ties also plays a significant factor.

But should China and Iran punish the Trump Administration in Afghanistan, President Trump's unpredictability would work against them. President Trump might decide to bring its Indo-Pacific partners with it into Afghanistan, to serve as a training ground. Giving Pacific nations like Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and India battle experience in Afghanistan could be one way to send a message to China about the potential cost for invading Taiwan.

The Trump Administration also might, additionally, thaw relations with Russia, through mutual partners India and Turkey. A thaw in US-Russian relations could lock Iran and China out of Afghanistan, while the US and Russia would divide influence between them. Then Afghanistan would no longer be the front line in the war on terror, but a new and deadly battleground in the Second Cold War.

The China-Iran Deal: Khamenei's Grand Vision

 

After losing Qassem Soleimani, Ayatollah Khamenei decided that if his regime is to collapse, it will be Chinese Communism, not US democracy, that inherits Iran.

Although the signed Nuclear Deal of 2015 initially gave Iran sanctions relief, the arrival of President Donald Trump snapped US sanctions back into place and returned the two nations to previous levels of hostility. As tensions escalated, the United States largely abstained from retaliation - until assassinating Qassem Soleimani, the man largely perceived to be second-in-command of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The assassination was embarrassing for the Islamic Republic. It has had a catastrophic impact on Iran's ability to retain influence in Iraq and might additionally see the end of the current Iran-friendly administration in Lebanon. To make matters worse: Qassem Soleimani was the most popular figure of the Islamic Republic - with him gone, the Iranian people will be more hostile than ever towards the regime. On all fronts, the US is defeating Iran.

But earlier this year a draft of a comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Iran was leaked to the international press. Though condemned by many in Iran's political sphere, it is unlikely to be the work of Hassan Rouhani, the Iranian President. It is far more likely to have been designed by the true authority, Ayatollah Khamenei, because for the Ayatollah, if Iran must compromise, it cannot and will not compromise with the murderers of Qassem Soleimani. Instead, it will compromise with China, another regime almost as hellbent on destroying America as Iran.

Increasingly, Iran and China are likely to work as strategic partners in all matters US-related. Particularly concerning for the US is the potential for the Taliban to join this Chinese-Iranian axis. Such an outcome would erupt Afghanistan into flames after the withdrawal of US forces. The United States would be forced to return to Afghanistan within a couple years, as with Iraq in 2014, and the US would be sufficiently distracted while Iran and China make consolidations elsewhere.

Although stoking the flames in Afghanistan is ideal for China, it would further the risk of war between Iran and the US. That said, it is very unlikely that President Donald Trump would ever go to war with Iran - but under the new strategic partnership, Iran is much more likely to be forced by China into fully supporting the Taliban and completely rejecting the US-backed Afghan government, which would force the US and Iran into yet another dangerous war by proxy.

In return, China would likely support an Iran-Hezbollah-backed coup on Lebanon. As mentioned in a previous article, as the economic situation in Lebanon gets worse, it becomes increasingly likely that Hezbollah will end up ruling the Arab nation. With Chinese support behind Iran and Hezbollah; with Afghanistan in flames and with Taiwan at increasing risk of Chinese invasion, there would be little appetite from the US to wage war with Hezbollah in Lebanon:

https://jwaveruspolitics.blogspot.com/2020/08/bankrupt-lebanon-to-be-ruled-by.html 

In spite of the mutual benefits for both China and Iran, Iran's independence will eventually be eroded and China will become the dominant partner. Yet even should the Islamic Republic be overthrown, their creed, "death to America, death to Israel" will live on in an Iran ruled by Chinese Communism.

Bankrupt Lebanon to be ruled by Hezbollah - analysis

It is no secret that the Syrian Arab Army occupied Lebanon for 29 years. But Hezbollah and Iran actively participating in the Syrian Civil War ensures that Syria will not return to Lebanon - Hezbollah and Iran, however, will.

In 1976 during the brutal Lebanese civil war, the Syrian Arab Army sent a large occupying force into Lebanon to stabilize the situation. Even after the civil war's completion in 1990, the Syrian government kept military control of Lebanon for the next 15 years, greatly frustrating certain elements of Lebanon's political apparatus until Syria's withdrawal in 2005.

But the Syrian Civil War (2011 - present) has changed the strategic calculus. Hezbollah, an important part of the unofficial Lebanese political-military structure, joined the Syrian Arab Army in an attempt to prevent the collapse of the Syrian government. After Russian involvement turned the tide in favour of President Assad, Hezbollah wielded an enormous amount of influence in both Syria and Lebanon.

To challenge this emerging strategic threat, the Trump Administration has prevented Lebanon from receiving any further economic bailouts until they first sever ties with Hezbollah. This has greatly exacerbated an already unstable economic condition. More than this, however: it has sowed the seeds of animosity between Lebanon and Hezbollah. Such animosity within Lebanon already started to show after Hezbollah took a side in the Syrian Civil War. In the eyes of the Arab world, this turned Hezbollah from an anti-Israeli organization into an anti-Sunni Muslim organization. Economic crises which can be directly blamed on Hezbollah threatens to bring the organization and the Lebanese people to breaking point.

All of this changes Hezbollah's calculus considerably. Israel is already putting pressure on all Iran-affiliated militias to not settle on Syria's Israeli border - should Lebanon go bankrupt, military might may indeed once again occupy Lebanon - but not the weakened Syrian Arab Army. Hezbollah's influence in Syria may indeed have bought it legitimacy from the Syrian government to act on its behalf and stabilize Lebanon militarily.

For Hezbollah to militarily occupy all of Lebanon, it would need to at least partially - if not completely - withdraw from Syria. For Iran, a withdrawal of Hezbollah from Syria could be part of a larger deal with Russia: Hezbollah hands over its control of Syria to Russia, on the condition of Russian support for a Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon.

Though a Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon does pose a significant risk to Israel, for the Trump Administration it would legitimize its maximum pressure strategy on Iran and help reveal to more of the Arab world just how malevolent Iranian influence is in the region. The takeover of Lebanon would, additionally, further weaken Iranian influence in Iraq - which is one of the Trump Administration's top priorities - as Iraqis would respond with fury, fearing the same thing would happen in Iraq at the hands of the Popular Mobilization Forces.

All of this would mean that the Trump Administration's top priority concerning Iran - weakening Iran's hold on Iraq - would be accomplished. Hezbollah's occupation of Lebanon may indeed signal the beginning of the end of Iranian influence in Iraq, and force Iran to consolidate its power in Lebanon and Syria at Iraq's expense.

For the Lebanese people, however, misery would ensue. A Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon would be under crippling sanctions, and with the likely loss of Baghdad to ensue, Iran's new centre of influence in the Arab world would be Lebanon and Beirut, and Hassan Nasrallah would become the Arab equivalent of Ayatollah Khomeini.

China, Iran and Afghanistan to collide: Trump's great test

Animosity between China and the United States has provided a much-needed lifeline for Iran. Further, increased Sino-Iranian cooperation could be disastrous for US policy in Afghanistan.

Until 2020, relations between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and the Trump Administration had been strained but respectful. The two superpowers found common ground on North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq and on an emerging trade deal. But the global pandemic of Covid-19 effectively destroyed US-Sino relations, and have the potential to throw the two superpowers into a Second Cold War.

But Hong Kong, Taiwan and the South China Sea are not the only arenas likely to be impacted by a Second Cold War. Iran is perhaps the United States' most imminent threat to its vision for the Middle-East, and China has important reasons to strike a strategic alliance with Iran, even at the risk of losing oil revenue from Gulf states like Saudi Arabia.

Apart from vengeance against the Trump Administration, the other crucial reason for increased Sino-Iranian relations would be to erode Indian influence. India has enjoyed warm relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran but is an adversary of China. China cutting into India's relations with Iran would be a big blow, as India would be locked out of the wider Central Asian market and forced to side with the US' belligerency towards Iran.

For Iran, too, the calculus with the United States has changed. Before 2020, Iran resisted US pressure but was ultimately likely to strike a new nuclear deal in order to survive economically. But with the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, Iran's prestige suffered a severe blow and a deal with the US has become too humiliating to stomach. Should Donald Trump get reelected, as is likely, Iran would rather strike a deal with Xi's China than with the Trump Administration.

In the event of reelection, China and Iran would be desperate to strike back, and this desperation makes them both likely to explore possible avenues of cooperation with the Taliban. After 2 and a half years of negotiation, the United States has recently concluded a peace deal with the Taliban. The US is to withdraw from Afghanistan and, in exchange, the Taliban has pledged not to let its territory be used for terrorist attacks and has pledged to negotiate with the Afghan government.

Should the Taliban uphold their end of the deal, the United States would withdraw its troops over a 14 month period. During this period, the Taliban are very much likely to comply with US demands and reject any overtures from Iran or China. Yet at the conclusion of these 14 months, the Taliban is likely to agree to Iranian and Chinese overtures, and the mutual benefit would be considerable to all three parties involved.

In this scenario, the US would be forced to return to Afghanistan and be too busy dealing with high levels of instability to turn its military might on Iran or China. It would be comparable to US reentry into Iraq in 2014. Should the US use Pakistan as a conduit into Afghanistan, China would be able to spy on the US through Pakistan and gain a further advantage in the Second Cold War, possibly forcing the United States to look for more expensive routes into Afghanistan.

A Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan would be a great test for President Trump. It would test his ability to find alternate solutions to the Afghan crisis, test his willingness to work with the Taliban, test how far he is willing to punish Iran and China for exacerbating the crisis and, finally, test whether he would strike a deal with a country like Russia to stabilize Afghanistan once and for all.

Will Iran and the United States go to war?

Under the Trump Administration, a military-backed regime change in Iran is almost unthinkable.

Many pundits around the world concluded six months ago that the assassination of Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani would lead to a US-led regime change war on Iran in the Middle-East. But Donald Trump will not jeopardize the reputation of his administration by invading Iran, particularly at a time when hostilities between China and the US are getting more heated and after running on a campaign of ending endless wars.

Most important for understanding a possible conflict between Iran and the United States is examining the scope of US military operations in the region today. The United States is currently committed to stabilizing Iraq, looks as if it will completely withdraw from Syria and is currently negotiating with the Taliban for an exit from Afghanistan.

If there is a war between Iran and the United States in the region, it is most likely to happen either in Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan. In Syria, there is an opportunity for Iran to make a quick victory over US forces concentrated on the Syrian-Iraqi border. But as Iran's strategic partners Syria, Russia and Turkey are all involved, this is the least likely of the three scenarios, as a confrontation might jeopardize Iran's relations with its strategic partners.

War between the US and Iran in Iraq is a more possible scenario, and is frightening. It would lead Iraq into its worst state of conflict yet, worse even than when ISIS invaded in 2014 and, unlike a US invasion of Iran's mainland, would likely result in US victory over the Iranians. The Gulf War of 1991 is a good example of the sort of conflict the US would engage in: in 1991, the US drove Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, destroyed Saddam's military forces but did not invade Iraq and conquer Baghdad. Similarly, a war between Iran and the US in Iraq would drive Iranian proxies and military forces out of Iraq, would destroy Iranian military targets but, after achieving these aims, the US would not proceed to invade Iran.

Afghanistan, however, is where the Iranians and the United States are most likely to engage militarily. Current negotiations look successful between the Taliban and the United States. However, it is possible that with Iranian support, the Taliban would initially agree to the United States' demands until the United States withdraws from Afghanistan. After the withdrawal, the Taliban may indeed march to Kabul and take down the Afghan government.

Such a scenario would propel Afghanistan into its worst instability in decades, and the US would be forced to return to Afghanistan with more military might than ever. But returning to Afghanistan is not straightforward. Since Afghanistan is land-locked, the United States needs entry through a country bordering Afghanistan. Pakistan and Iran both have borders with Afghanistan and have both been hostile to US interests there. Worse, in the midst of a destabilized Afghanistan, the US and Iran might find themselves on opposite ends of an escalated conflict there, with little ability to deescalate tensions.

But unlike in Iraq, an Iran war in Afghanistan gives the advantage to Iran, not to the United States. Iran would not need to invade Afghanistan directly, but merely finance the Taliban to take down the Afghan government. In fact, the Afghan government might secretly negotiate with the Iranians for such a scenario to occur. The Afghan government prefers to have the United States in Afghanistan, and would leverage an Iran-backed Taliban as incentive for the United States to return. That said, an Iran-funded Taliban in Afghanistan is the most possible scenario for US defeat at the hands of Iran.

The Trump Administration will not, under almost any circumstances, invade Iran directly. But as Iran's economy continues to crash, Iran might just decide it has more to gain out of direct military confrontation with the US in a neighbouring country than out of negotiations. This increases the likelihood of more endless war in Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan, and would challenge the Trump Administration's foreign policy as never before.

Cold War 2 meets a burning Middle-East

President Trump's policy of blaming China for Coronavirus and harshly criticizing China for its handling of Hong Kong has the intended effect of lighting what has been dubbed a new Cold War. This article will explore the implications of Cold War 2 for the Middle-East.

If you thought the Middle-East was already burning, it is about to burn a whole lot worse. Geopolitical maneuvering in the Middle-East has been showing a distinct trend, and that trend is in favour of Russia. Once China adds its weight to the Middle-East, the United States will be left on the back foot, having allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia but alienating most other players. Here are some predictions for the Middle-East in the advent of a new Cold War with China:



1) China will help Russia sort out the Syrian Civil War. Progress on the Syrian Civil War has stalled thanks to US sanctions on Iran and sanctions on the Syrian government. It has also stalled because of friction between Turkey and Russia. Still fiercely protective of rebel-held Idlib province, Turkey inflicted damage on Iranian and Syrian targets as they approached Turkish observation posts and has not stopped its rhetoric against Bashar Al-Assad.

But once Cold War 2 begins, Syria is a must-win for China and Russia, as it will shore up Sino-Russian power in the Middle-East and deprive the US of any chance of influence there. Very likely, China will use its powers of persuasion to win Turkey over to the Sino-Russian sphere of influence.

2) China will establish cordial relations with Turkey in absence of the US. US-Turkish relations have been steadily deteriorating since President Barrack Obama decided to use PKK-linked Kurds in the US war with ISIS in Syria. Though President Erdogan was initially optimistic of policy change, President Donald Trump continued to back the Kurds in Syria and forced Erdogan to establish ever closer ties with Russia.

As a result, President Erdogan has bought the S-400 missile defense system from Russia, which is incompatible with US military equipment and would likely cause Turkey, in the long-term, to be expelled from NATO. Though the US has threatened Turkey with sanctions, Chinese entry into the Middle-East gives President Erdogan the perfect opportunity to show itself as an independent player: it could keep the S-400 missile defense system and align itself more closely with China. Should Sino-Turkish relations soar, Turkey would not be seen as Russia's pawn but as a partner on an equal playing field with both China and Russia. This would certainly soften the blow of the loss of influence over Syria, as Chinese-Turkish cooperation would greatly frustrate US intentions with Iran, Syria and the wider region.

3) After US withdrawal, Afghanistan will experience terrible civil war. For war-weary Afghanistan, the worst may be yet to come. Although the Taliban has signed an agreement with the United States, it is unlikely the Taliban will in the long-term keep to that agreement: they are likely to do so until the United States is out of Afghanistan, and then they will likely fight to recapture Kabul from what they see as an American puppet.

The Afghan Taliban is backed by Pakistan which, in turn, is backed by China. Expecting the Taliban to stay quiet in Afghanistan is about as likely as expecting Iraq to stay stable after US withdrawal in 2011. And, like Iraq in 2014, Afghanistan is going to become incredibly unstable and overrun. However, the difference is that the Afghan Taliban are backed by the Chinese.

4) Iran and the US might go to war in Iraq. Neither side wants war - but China might help provoke a conflict between the United States and Iran. The only way this could be accomplished would be through exploiting both countries' interests in Iraq. Should Turkey solidify its partnership with China and Russia, this would only help Iran evade US sanctions, which makes war between the two powers more likely. While the United States is extremely unlikely to ever invade Iran, they might go to war in the Persian Gulf or in Iraq, forcing Iraq into its worst conflict yet.

5) Mohammed Bin Salman's Saudi Arabia will implode. A crashing economy, an authoritarian Crown Prince, public ties with Israel - should King Salman Al-Saud die, Mohammed Bin Salman would be the new Saudi king, and the Arabian tribes would very likely break away. This would see the United States occupying eastern Arabia to protect the oilfields, but would leave Mohammed Bin Salman to recapture the rest of Arabia.

For the war against ISIS, this would be devastating, as many tribes in northern and central Arabia are also found in Iraq and Syria. The Arabian tribes would be pulled into the ISIS ideology with even more fervor than has been seen thus far in the Syrian-Iraqi conflict. The frightening scenario of ISIS taking control of Mecca and Medina is no laughing matter, and is a possibility should Saudi Arabia become the latest stage of a proxy war between the United States and China. If China succeeds in winning Turkey over to the Sino-Russian axis, Turkey would likely have no qualms about using ISIS to crush Mohammed Bin Salman. It tried a similar policy in Syria. Such a daring idea could even see Turkish influence expanded to Arabia in the name of fighting ISIS.


Should China engage in the Middle-East to fight in proxy wars with the United States, the whole region would be brought from breaking point to something even worse. Unfortunately for them, the worst of the fighting is definitely yet to come.

The Fracturing of Iran's Shi'ite Crescent

Although the recent sanctions of the US Congress' Caesar Act are targeted against the Syrian Arab Republic, US President Donald Trump's intended targets may be Iraq and Iran.

President Trump has criticized both George W. Bush and Barrack Obama for their handling of Iraq during their presidencies: for George Bush, it was for the initial invasion in 2003; for Barrack Obama it was for the way he withdrew from Iraq in 2011. President Trump has shown a markedly different Iraq policy - one centered on strong, firm support for Iraq while antagonizing Iran.

Previous rounds of sanctions on Iran led by the Trump Administration forced the people of Iraq and Lebanon out in protest against their Iran-backed governments and economic mismanagement. In Lebanon, they have frayed Hezbollah's control and may yet change the political status quo. In Iraq, protests have shocked Iraq's government to its core and, eventually, are likely to inspire regime change more in favour of the autocratic wing of the Middle-East (UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia) and less in favour of Iran. Together with the death of Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani in January this year, things are looking dire for Iran's Shi'ite Crescent.

Due to economic support from China and Russia, sanctions against the Syrian Arab Republic are unlikely to force Bashar Al-Assad out of office or bankrupt his regime. For Iran, however, the already dire economic situation from Tehran to Beirut is made even more so, and is likely to require Iran to make a further strategic withdrawal from the Middle-East.

Iraq is likely where Iran will have to make their concessions first. Increasingly, Baghdad and the Shi'ite Arab south will not be a place welcome for the Shi'ite militias of Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi. Although the militias were popular in their fight against ISIS, Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi have worked hard to make sure that they remain well paid for throughout the sanctions, alienating them from Iraqi protesters who do not share such a luxury.

Should Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi be forced out of Iraq's south, the militias are likely to be sent into the Sunni Arab and Kurdish regions nominally controlled by the Iraqi Army. There the Sunni Arabs and ethnically mixed lands near Kirkuk would be unable to protest their presence as the Shi'ite south has done and, at a pinch, Iran would still be able to make sure its land corridor from Tehran to Beirut remains well protected.

Yet unlike in Iraq, Syrians do not protest the Iran-backed militias. Either they are too frightened to by the apparatus of the Assad regime, or they are grateful for the role the militias played in freeing their country from civil war. As Russia, Turkey and Iran reach a political settlement which solidifies Assad's hold on the nation, this Syrian patriotism for Iran and its proxies is likely to be stirred up even further.

But today, the Shi'ite Arabs of Lebanon and Iraq protest Iranian proxies. After 5-10 more years of US sanctions, it is not hard to see that Hezbollah and Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi might even be forced out of these regions altogether: not by war, but by economic necessity. Intriguingly, once bankrupt, the Iranian proxies of the Arab world might flee to Syria to live in refuge, as the Syrian Arab Republic would be more immune to sanctions due to Sino-Russian support.

The exile of Hezbollah from Lebanon and Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi militias from Iraq may currently seem a remote possibility, but two years ago widespread protests in Lebanon and Iraq against Iran also seemed a remote possibility. President Trump's lasting legacy for the region may indeed be a pro-American Iraq, a defanged Lebanon and a Syria dominated by Iran's proxies.

Why regime change in Iran won't be pro-US

After leading the charge against Communism for 50 years, the Iraq war and the Afghan war, the last thing the American people want is war and occupation of Iran.

Under President Trump, the United States is waging economic war with a variety of nations - from Asian nations China and North Korea to Russia, Turkey and Pakistan. But nowhere is economic war more focused than against Iran.

The objective of sanctions against Iran, according to President Trump - and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu - is to get a new deal to replace the previous Iran Deal negotiated by Barrack Obama. However, should Iran Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei not comply, the Iranian economy will continue to erode and regime change will be inevitable.

Yet there is no chance Iran will erupt in civil war. Though the Iranian people are frustrated with the current regime, they are more terrified of instability than of Khamenei and the mullahs. Seeing instability in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Libya is the main reason for this.

Like in 1979, the next Iranian revolution will not be bloody. There are two alternatives, and neither of them would be pro-United States.

The first alternative is that Qassem Suleimani will become the next leader of Iran. Should Iranian protests grow and Ali Khamenei order the Quds force to fire on civilians, it is possible that Suleimani will claim Khamanei has lost his Islamic legitimacy and take control of Tehran. Should that occur, it would be a nightmare for the US, Israel and their allies.

The second alternative is that the Iranian army will engage in a military coup against the Iranian regime and take control of Tehran. Military coups are common in the Middle-East, with the most recent one taking place in Egypt in 2013.

In either scenario, relations between Russia and Iran would strengthen and the US would not be able to make inroads. The Middle-East is well aware that the United States has had an incompetent track record in its foreign policy in the region - conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria were all exacerbated by American idealism over any real interest to engage with regional issues.

The most recent example of this would be the United States still calling for a return to the Geneva talks in the Syrian conflict, though Geneva has proven much less successful than the Russia-backed Astana and Sochi talks.

On the other hand, Russia is on the ascendancy in the Middle-East because it has largely cooperated with regional actors and sought the best for each nation on balance. For Syria, Iran, Turkey and Israel, Russia under President Putin has engaged in delicate diplomacy to provide the best needs for each regional actor in the context of the Syrian crisis. First and foremost, it has restored control of Syria to the Syrian Arab Army and has cleared out the majority of the region from ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

For Israel, Russia has made sure that the Syrian-Israeli border does not become a stage for another proxy war with Iran. For Turkey, Russia has allowed the country to militarily intervene against Kurdish separatists in northern Syria. It is likely that Turkey will acquiesce to Bashar Al-Assad controlling Syria on the condition that the Kurdish enclave in northern Syria be disbanded.

Because of this, in the event of regime change, Iran is unlikely to realign with the US-Israeli-Gulf axis. Instead, Iran is likely to keep its current alliances and only shift rhetoric. Whether the rhetoric turns more extreme or less will depend on whether the Quds force or the Iranian military take charge after the mullahs.

Trump faces risk in Afghanistan as Putin did in the Ukraine

With the collapse in US-Pakistani relations, Pakistani-Russian reproach risks surrounding Afghanistan with Russian allies, forcing the US into a very uncomfortable position.


President Trump's South Asia strategy is working. The worsening instability in Afghanistan is a byproduct of a successful strategy: if the Taliban and Pakistan weren't worried, the violence would not be at the level of intensity that it is now.

As a result of the South Asia strategy, Indian-US ties are strengthening and Pakistani-US relations are worsening. This re-calibration of US alliances in South Asia is leading Pakistan and Russia - who traditionally have not been allies - into solidifying an alliance that leaves Afghanistan surrounded on all of its borders by Russian-Chinese allies.

This would not normally be an issue - except that, should China and Russia deal the US a defeat in Afghanistan, the US' ability to rival China as a superpower would be threatened in the long-term. Beneath the mountains of Afghanistan are an estimated trillions of dollars-worth of minerals. The minerals in Afghanistan are some of the last major mineral monopolies not held by China. Should the US be driven out of Afghanistan, it would also be driven out of one of the last major mineral monopolies, and its ability to compete economically with China in the future would be seriously challenged.

As in 2011, Pakistan may close off its land and air routes into Afghanistan, leaving the US to take the long route through central Asia. But in 2011, Pakistan relied on a later improvement in US-Pakistani relations. Today, it no longer relies on the US as it has both Russian and Chinese backing. In short, it could close off its land and air routes into Afghanistan indefinitely with less to lose than in 2011.

This makes it easier for Russian/Chinese allies to choke off all supply by sea for Afghanistan. Not only does Afghanistan border Pakistan - it borders central Asian countries to the north, which are closely allied to Russia, and it borders anti-American Iran to the west.

Such a scenario would leave President Donald Trump as hamstrung in Afghanistan as President Putin was in Ukraine in 2014. Like Ukraine for President Putin, Afghanistan is central to American geopolitical interests.

Should supply be held off by all countries bordering Afghanistan, President Trump would be forced into either withdrawal from Afghanistan - which would threaten US interest in Asia - or into forcibly seizing a sea route from one of Afghanistan's neighbours. The more likely choice? President Trump would be more likely to seize a sea route from one of Afghanistan's neighbours and, of the countries which border Afghanistan, Iran is the most likely candidate for US invasion.

Yet like George H. Bush's foreign policy with Iraq, President Trump would not want to invade and occupy all of Iran, as this would inflame tensions between Russia and the US to breaking point. Instead, a limited operation to annex a south-eastern province from Iran would be the ideal strike against the Russian ally. Not only would Afghanistan be able to have access to the sea and Iran's nuclear program be threatened - annexing Iran's south-eastern province would separate Iran from Pakistan. They would no longer border each other.

Such a precision strike by the US would humiliate the Iranian Army - which has long backed the Ayatollah and the Iranian regime - but would also be far easier than regime change, as Iran's south-east is sparsely populated and ethnically close to the Afghans.

It would create tensions between the Iranian Army and State which could be manipulated by the US for years to come. It would aid President Trump in his struggle for Afghanistan, reassure Israel and Middle-East partners of President Trump's willingness to tackle Iran and, crucially, connect Afghanistan to the wider Middle-East.

This risk of President Trump annexing Iran's south-eastern province is vividly similar to President Putin's own annexation of the Crimea from Ukraine. Faced with losing dominance over the Black Sea and less of a buffer between NATO and its own borders, Russian President Vladimir Putin annexed the Crimea from Ukraine to defend its interests against Europe and the US. Given that both Putin and Trump base their foreign policy on putting the needs of their own countries first, in desperation, President Trump is likely to try such a brazen move as Putin did in his own desperation.

With the collapse in US-Pakistani relations, Pakistani-Russian reproach risks surrounding Afghanistan with Russian allies, forcing the US into a very uncomfortable position. But, like Vladimir Putin with Crimea, it would still be likely to go President Trump's way.

Why President Trump is not a war President

Though many of President Trump's political enemies would love him to be painted in such a light, President Trump has shown curious restraint that many other candidates of the 2016 election - both Republican and Democrat - would not have.

The most famous - and frightening - call for war from Presidential candidates of 2016 was for an invasion of Syria against the Russians, to establish a no-fly-zone - something Marco Rubio, Jeb Bush, Lindsey Graham and Hillary Clinton all pushed for in their foreign policy. President Trump, while bombing Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib, Syria, did so as a stunt against North Korea and to keep his foreign policy looking unpredictable.

Nor is it likely that President Trump will go to war with North Korea. Intense diplomatic pressure has been put on North Korea, China and Russia to deal with the threat Pyongyang represents to the region by seeking to acquire nuclear missiles. Contrary to Media narrative, the diplomatic pressure has been highly successful, and President Trump has been able to avoid war on the Korean peninsula while crippling the regime with harsher and harsher sanctions.

With the exception of the war on ISIL, Afghanistan is about the only war President Trump has committed to. This is in line with President Trump's "America First" foreign policy, as a stable Afghanistan not only denies terror safe havens for Al-Qaeda, ISIL and the Taliban - US presence in is also strengthens bilateral relations with India against the growing influence of China, as well as curbs Pakistan's dangerous moves in support of the Taliban.

President Trump seems highly uninterested in starting a war - whether it be against Syria and Russia, North Korea, or even Iran or Pakistan. Trump is more interested in finishing wars - that is, cleaning up the mess left behind by both the Bush and Obama Administrations, namely in Iraq and Afghanistan, and using such nations as platforms from which to shine the hope of democracy into the Middle-East and Asia.

It is such a shock to the world that a US president who acts as Donald Trump does would be more interested in peace than either of his predecessors. But that is the reality: President Trump is interested in stabilizing both Iraq and Afghanistan, followed by turning US focus back home, to make America Great Again and restore the US' reputation globally.

US-Russian reproach to follow Pakistan debacle?

The US needs a stable route into Afghanistan.

More important for the US than economic security for their mission in Afghanistan - which is what Pakistan has provided for the US over the last 16 years - is regional security. Pakistan has continued to show that it is unwilling to give up on its dangerous foreign policy, which allows US troops to use Pakistan as a base while also funding the very Taliban the US are trying to destroy.

Should Pakistani-US relations continue to sour - as seems highly likely under the Trump Administration - the US will be forced to use the more expensive Central Asia route. The route through Central Asia forces the US to deal with its strained relations with Moscow, for to have access to Central Asia requires Russian approval.

The US would likely be able to reach common ground on Afghanistan with the Kremlin, as Moscow is in no position currently to tackle the jihad threat in that region, but thorny issues like Ukraine and Syria present a difficulty for the two world powers. One sure way to ease tensions between Washington and Moscow would be for the Trump Administration to tacitly approve the political process in Syria, allow Bashar Al-Assad to stay in power and stop the rhetoric of regime change.

Such thawing of Russian-US relations also has the potential to drive a wedge between Russia and China, as Russia is far more concerned about the rising terror threat in the region than its counterpart in Beijing. China sees Pakistan and its foreign policy as advantageous to holding back India and gaining leverage over mineral reserves in Afghanistan. Though Russia has also been eying those mineral reserves, the Kremlin is aware that mineral monopoly is not worth risking instability and terrorism for the Russian Federation.

Given President Trump's long held view that he would get along well with President Putin, it is time for a thawing of relations between the two world powers regarding Afghanistan. Otherwise the US will be unable to achieve the results it desires for Afghanistan and the South Asia region.

Trump's Afghanistan Strategy is an Asia Strategy

In late August President Donald Trump recommitted US forces to Afghanistan, to defeat the Taliban and to help the US achieve military victory there as part of his South Asia strategy. But President Trump's strategy represents more than victory over the Taliban, and has implications even larger than just South Asia. President Trump's strategy in Afghanistan is an integral part of a successful US pivot towards Asia.

President Trump is using his strategy in Afghanistan to reshape US alliances in Asia. In President Trump's speech, rhetoric against Pakistan was made harsher and an invitation was extended for India to invest more fully in Afghanistan. The US has calculated that in Asia, India is an essential long-term ally and will thus receive the lion's share of benefits from Afghanistan at the expense of Pakistan. The US is turning the Afghan War into a proxy war between India and Pakistan, a proxy war that India is likely to invest in victory for.

As a result of this policy, US-Pakistani relations are deteriorating. This gives India the reassurance they need that they will be a highly prized US ally and will be able to commit long-term to the US over other geopolitical contenders, such as Russia. Pakistan, on the other hand, will be forced to rely more exclusively on China and Russia and, given Pakistani links to terrorism, Pakistan will taint Russian and Chinese reputations in Asia.

The geopolitical calculation of the Trump Administration is that together, the US and India are a powerhouse which can match growing Chinese influence. Victory in Afghanistan would see an enormous economic boost for India and the US, and would allow both countries to rely less on China for unearthing rare minerals. Estimates put the minerals in Afghanistan as worth trillions of dollars, and securing those resources with a government in Afghanistan friendly to India and the US would mean that India and the US would compete with China in the minerals' monopoly.

The South Asia strategy, together with harsher measures on North Korea and more open US-Taiwanese relations, sees a US that is pivoting away from quagmires in the Middle-East and towards Asia. In a stronger Indian-US alliance cemented in Afghanistan, China is finally faced with a worthy adversary.

Trump to ignite proxy war with China in Afghanistan

In the Presidential campaign, Donald Trump promised to be harsher on China. Today, President Trump's actions are beginning to match his campaign rhetoric.

More US pressure has been exerted on China from a number of fronts. First of these is North Korea, with President Trump pushing for President Xi Jinping to reel in its unstable neighbor. As well as this is increased relations between Taiwan and the US, largely unnoticed in the American media.

But perhaps the most serious challenge to China is President Trump's ambition to continue the Afghan War. The US has long backed the Afghan government, previously headed by President Hameed Kharzai and now headed by President Ashraf Ghani. China, on the other hand, backs Pakistan who, in turn, back the Taliban. And Al-Qaeda leader, Ayman Az-Zawahiri, pledges allegiance to the Taliban leader.

Trump's aim is to expose Chinese tacit support of terrorism in Afghanistan. China is a staunch ally of Pakistan, and Pakistan arms and gives safe haven to the Taliban. For Trump, exposing Chinese support for the Taliban would allow the US to monopolize on the minerals which lie at the heart of Afghanistan.

Over the last 15 years, US has been unable to win either Afghanistan or Iraq, and has also accrued enormous levels of debt. The Iraq War decreased support for America globally and distracted the US from the Afghan War. George W. Bush also increased government spending while increasing tax breaks for American workers, resulting in a 5.8 trillion dollar increase to the US national debt.

Under President Obama, relations between select allies was strained by several contradictory policies, such as support for the Arab Spring, the overthrow of Qaddafi, support to Syrian rebels and the Iran nuclear deal. Obama policies on Afghanistan and Iraq allowed the Taliban to resurge and ISIS to proclaim a Caliphate. And under Obama, the debt soared to even greater heights, an addition of a staggering 11 trillion dollars.

For Donald Trump, Afghanistan is more than just a terror safe haven needing to be eradicated. US influence internationally is waning; Chinese and Russian influence is growing. One way to sustain US influence internationally is by monopolizing on the minerals in Afghanistan, of which some estimates conclude are up to 3 trillion dollars in worth. But should the US fail to win the war, China would have total dominion over all major mineral reserves, and the US' status as a superpower may be challenged as never before.

For US strategy in Afghanistan, there are worrying signs from key members of President Trump's staff. Rex Tillerson, the Secretary of State, has stated that the US may not win on the battlefield, but neither will the Taliban, undermining Trump's rhetoric of winning in Afghanistan, and Trump's suggestion that the Taliban may not even want to negotiate. Both Tillerson and General Nicholson have stated they wish to push the Taliban to the negotiating table, a flawed strategy and counter to Trump's own Afghan policy speech.

In Afghanistan, President Trump wants to defeat the Taliban - and, by extension, Pakistan and China - which is why he has brought India into the forefront. India, like China, is an emerging superpower. Letting India have more influence in Afghanistan is more likely to achieve a lasting victory.

Since the Iraq War, the US has been unable to score many lasting victories in their foreign policy. Should the US lose the Afghan War, it would add to their long list of military disasters which have transpired over the last 14 years.

Trump laments failures in Afghanistan

According to a report by NBC news, Trump has been unwilling to sign off the new Afghanistan strategy because it does not represent a sizable enough shift from the Bush-Obama era:

http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-says-u-s-losing-afghan-war-tense-meeting-generals-n789006

He lamented bitterly, complaining that though US troops were fighting and dying there, China was making the most profit out of the conflict, while Trump continually called for the firing of General John Nicholson, in charge of the war in Afghanistan. He also complained about the use of NATO and the incompetency of the generals to win the war after 16 years. Amusingly, he compared the generals' strategies to a business proposal in a failing New York restaurant, and said that the veterans of the Afghan war had given him more sound advice than the generals had.

Trump is right to be critical of US policy in Afghanistan. Obama's strategy has been rightly called wanting to 'not lose the war' and including absurd policies like announcing surges and withdrawals simultaneously. At its height, 100,000 troops were in Afghanistan under Obama, but due to announcing their withdrawal at the same time, the Taliban just hid and waited them out. The only positive which happened under Obama in Afghanistan was the killing of Bin Laden in neighboring Pakistan.

Bush's strategy on Afghanistan was one of negligence. The first two years of war showed remarkable success against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, but this was all wasted by the Iraq War, which saw Afghanistan fall into the background. With ISIS almost defeated in Iraq and Syria, Trump will likely do the opposite: Iraq will fall to the background and Afghanistan will be brought to the foreground.

Trump's own ideas behind Afghanistan are remarkable. His ideas include taking control of the mineral reserves which bankroll the Taliban - while this would likely require a significant troop surge, the goal of securing the mineral reserves offers something tangible to both Afghan and US troops: economics.

What is paramount is that Trump needs to make a decision soon. Morale among Afghan troops is waning, the Taliban continues to win the war, and many Afghan war veterans are worried that their sacrifice will be in vain. Winning the Afghan War is crucial for stability in the Middle-East and for Trump's own credibility. Trump cannot afford another Vietnam.

Why a US-Russian conflict over Syria is unlikely

Trump has used military force against Bashar Al-Assad after the alleged chemical attack in Khan Sheikhoun. And this is the basis from which to expect the US will not go to war with Russia over Syria.

When Trump struck the Syrian Government before - the US' first use of military on the Syrian Government in the entirety of the civil war - Russia responded by suspending the cooperation line between the US and Russia, which had been established months after Russia entered the conflict. The US, in turn, decided to send drones to bomb ISIS in north-western Syria, to avoid planes being shot down by Russian military. Eventually the crisis was resolved and the cooperation line restored.

More recently, the US has struck Iranian allies in Syria which encroached too close to US-backed forces, both the Free Syrian Army in the south of the country and the mainly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces. The US also shot down a Syrian aircraft, the first time the US shot down one such as this in the entirety of the Syrian Civil War.

Russia has, once again, suspended the cooperation line between the US and Russia. Even more drastic has been the Russian threat to shoot down any US aircraft found west of the Euphrates river - the city of Raqqa, thankfully, sits to the east of the Euphrates.

This recent rise in tensions has been compared to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the closest time then USSR and the United States reached a state of nuclear war. And experts fear that a large conflict may result from this rising of tensions in Syria.

But it is unlikely that the US will allow itself to be drawn into a conflict against Russia in Syria. The reason should be obvious: the best time to strike Russian and Syrian military forces was after Khan Sheikhoun, when Trump had the element of surprise.

Because Trump only struck the air base and not the Damascus palace, it is clear that Trump policy is not directed against regime change in Syria. It should be more obvious given Trump's statement after striking the Syrian airbase: "we are not going into Syria."

To be fair, the US will be directing future policy against Iranian influence in the Middle-East - but Syria is not the country at the forefront of Trump policy against Iran. The countries to be targeted by the Trump Administration to decrease Iranian influence include Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen, and perhaps the Kurds in Syria as well.

But unlikely - very unlikely - that Trump will use military force against Russia and Syria to oust Bashar Al-Assad.

Why Afghanistan is key to containing Iran

For more information:
https://www.dawn.com/news/1339411
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/trump-afghanistan-mineral-reserves-235962


In Trump's search for containing Iran, one of the most viable options is Afghanistan.

In the campaign Trump talked about how the Iraq War knocked out a "block" in the Middle-East spheres of influence. A country with traditionally Sunni and secular leadership, Saddam Hussein under the Ba'ath party, was knocked out and replaced with Iranian dominance stretching from Tehran to Beirut unabated.

Now the areas in which Iranian dominance can be countered are scarcer. In Syria and Yemen, the two countries in which Saudi Arabia is waging proxy wars, the conflicts are unlikely to produce the results necessary to beat back Iran. Both sides chosen by Saudi Arabia - the Syrian rebels and the Hadi government - are exceedingly unpopular with the people of each nation and these proxy wars are, subsequently, doomed to fail.

As for Iraq, well, nobody is interested in regime change there to counter Iranian influence.

Afghanistan, however, has a small Shi'ite population and has enormous economic potential. Instead of engaging in proxy wars in Yemen or Syria, which destabilize the region, a US focus to strengthen Afghanistan against Iran would mean that a new "block" would emerge in Iraq's place.

The Trump Administration has even suggested that they will do such a thing. Jim Mattis, the Secretary of Defense, has suggested that the Afghan policy will be comprehensive and will include a regional approach, focusing on India, Pakistan, the whole South Asian area and "especially Iran." This suggests that the Afghan policy will include making sure that the government in Kabul has no reproachment with Iran and acts as a bulwark against growing Iranian influence.

However, such stabilizaton of Afghanistan would be insufficient to completely counter Iranian dominance in the Middle-East, but it would be a key starting point. Other options include making Iraq more neutral in the Sunni-Shi'ite proxy wars, increased relations between an anti-Iranian Afghanistan and Iraq and between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

In any case, an anti-Iran Afghanistan would give many in Washington a renewed desire to pursue stability in Afghanistan. It would certainly go ways to containing Iranian influence and stop their meddling.

McMaster's Afghan War, and Trump's likely response to it

Trump's National Security Advisor, H. R. McMaster, has given Trump a new plan for Afghanistan. In it, McMaster suggests that 50,000 American troops should be deployed, the Afghani government should be strengthened and the Taliban should be "brought to the negotiating table."

50,000 American troops will not solve the Afghan debacle. On the one hand, American public support for the war is waning. On the other hand, an American troop surge could betray Trump's platform of "America First" by getting bogged down in Afghanistan with no end in sight.

It is more likely that Trump will take the concept - 50,000 troops - and apply it to NATO, making Afghanistan a NATO project rather than an American one. As stated in previous articles, this would reinforce Trump's stance on making NATO directed towards radical Islamic terrorism rather than towards Russia. At the same time, with Russia eyeing Afghanistan closely on the side of the Taliban, NATO partners could be convinced that a show of force in Afghanistan is actually a show of force against Russia anyway.

While the Afghani government should be strengthened, this strengthening should not be through rebuilding infrastructure that the Taliban will just knock down. A more sensible way to provide support to the government is by wresting back control of the different resources from the Taliban, which on the one hand deprive the Taliban of these resources and on the other hand provide opportunity for the Afghan government to be more independent of foreign aid.

Bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table is the worst idea of all. Al-Qaeda's leader pledges allegiance to the leader of the Taliban. Taliban and Al-Qaeda are one and the same. Ignoring this fact will ensure the Afghan War is never won.

The only solution for Afghanistan is in the complete and utter destruction of the Taliban. Trump has shown admiration for Russia's fight against ISIS - a similar campaign of annihilation against the Taliban is the only way to bring peace to Afghanistan.

Trump staying out of Libya!

For more information, see here:


https://pjmedia.com/news-and-politics/2017/04/20/trump-no-role-for-u-s-in-libya-but-will-fight-isis-in-iraq-or-libya-or-anywhere-else/


It looks like Trump is keeping to his campaign promise of getting America out of the "nation-building business," and staying out of Libya!

This is fantastic news. When pressed by the Italian Prime Minister, Trump stated that America had "enough responsibilities" without adding Libya to the list. He also stated that he hoped he would be able to focus on domestic US policy once ISIS was defeated.

It is not only fantastic because it is great policy - it is policy I predicted in earlier posts, such as my post, "why American allies can expect no help from Libya."

http://jwaveruspolitics.blogspot.com.au/2017/01/why-american-allies-can-expect-no-help.html

It also signals that while Trump is going to talk the talk with regards to Bashar Al-Assad, there is every possibility that he won't walk the walk and militarily push for the removal of Assad. If his focus really is on ISIS in Syria and then return to American domestic policy, then Trump is likely to leave Assad in power without a military confrontation.

Trump's Middle-East: an April Update

Trump's Middle-East is continuing to take shape.

An unprecedented airstrike in Syria; deteriorated Russian-US relations; "Mother of All Bombs in Afghanistan"; the Yemen Question still unanswered.

There's a lot to talk about.

First, the unprecedented airstrike in Syria was unexpected, unpredictable and won Trump enormous support from long-time allies such as Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, while damaging relations with Russia. But while it represents a shift in strategy, the priority for the US remains the destruction of ISIS in Syria and, consequently, Trump will be forced to strengthen the ruling Assad Government.

However, I doubt - highly - that Rex Tillerson, the American Secretary of State, will succeed in ousting Bashar Al-Assad from Syria, either through negotiations with Russia or through military conflict. The US' military has no appetite for world war 3 with Russia over Syria, nor for supporting Syrian rebels, so should Russians say, "Assad will stay," there would be little America would do, save protest and add sanctions to Syria and to Russia.

Plus, Russia has suffered a string of humiliations: Ukraine and Libya are chief among them from the Obama years. Keeping Assad in power would be Russia putting dirt in America's eye for humiliating them and declining their influence. And Trump - with his military behind him - would be unwilling to wage war over Syria.

The unleashed "Mother of All Bombs" in Afghanistan serves as another lesson of unpredictability from the Trump Administration. Apparently the operation was against an ISIS network of tunnels and was successful, killing dozens of militants and no civilians. This serves to tell the American people: the Afghan war will grind on - certainly to defeat ISIS.

But it is likely that Trump will want to win the Afghan War - against the Taliban - during his Presidency. It has been going for over 15 years - if Trump wins the Afghan War, then that will go down in his legacy. I sincerely believe he will escalate the Afghan conflict to enable it to reach its conclusion before engaging in either Libya or Yemen.

Like Obama, Trump has shown reluctance to get involved in Libya. There is simply not enough there for them. Russia has taken the opportunity to fill the void, and Trump has been silent, largely because he - silently - supports Russian intervention there.

The reason for this is that the Egyptian President, Abdul Feteh es-Sisi, is a staunch ally of Haftar Al-Khalifa, the Libyan strongman who Russia supports. If Trump went against Russia, it would be against Haftar Al-Khalida and against Egypt - a cold shoulder from Trump as he received from Obama, which Trump does not want for Egypt.

Truly, Trump has struck an ingenious chord by bombing Syria: it blows the "Russian-supported Trump" narrative out of the water, yet also lets Russia do what they like in Libya without blow back from the US, because the west is too busy saber-rattling over Syria!

In Yemen, the question of increased military intervention is still unanswered. Will Trump escalate against the Houthi rebels? Should he do it, it would be the biggest error of his presidency thus far. As I have detailed in other posts, the northern Yemeni tribes allied to the Houthis would sooner ally to Al-Qaeda than to President Hadi. Trump would be strengthening Al-Qaeda by escalating the war against the Houthis.

In Iraq, things are looking like they are heading in the right direction. Mosul is close to completely liberated - the trick for Trump will be stabilizing Iraq, which is probably Trump's most difficult Middle-East challenge. But I have no complaints about Trump's intention to stay in Iraq indefinitely, as that will encourage him to leave other conflicts alone at a faster rate - like Syria, Yemen and Libya - and encourage Trump to win the Afghan War.

Such is Trump's Middle-East thus far. Time will tell where it will end up.