The Arabian Gulf: the coming calamity

US pivot to the Pacific; Gulf kingdoms' ties with Israel; Iraqi and Afghan priorities; an Iranian-Chinese strategic partnership - all of these factors increase the likelihood of the US losing its dominance of the Arabian Gulf.

As with Iran in 1979, the United States once again faces the likelihood of losing a large portion of influence in the Middle-East.

The 1979 revolution did not happen by accident. By the late 1960's staunch US ally Britain was no longer willing to maintain its superpower status and made a strategic withdrawal from the global stage. To make up for Britain's absence, the US increasingly relied on the Shah of Iran to help it police the region. Unfortunately, core financial issues coupled with strong relations with Israel left Iran ripe for Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution and forced the Shah out of power.

Similarly to Britain 60 years ago, under Donald Trump the United States is looking to make a strategic withdrawal, particularly from the Middle-East and from Europe. At the same time, the US is focusing its military assets on the Pacific and ramping up pressure on adversaries China and Iran. While the US is certainly likely to prevent Chinese dominance in the Pacific, its simultaneous pressure on Iran and China gives both nations a timely opportunity for Middle-Eastern dominance.

Earlier this year a draft of a strategic partnership between China and Iran was leaked to the international press. If Donald Trump is reelected President, it is highly likely the two powers would implement the partnership and ignite Cold War 2 with the United States. In such a scenario, China would not need to invade Taiwan to defeat the US; instead, China would be able to apply sizeable pressure on the US in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and the Arabian Gulf through its partnership with Iran - to deadly effect.

Should China back Iran's efforts for Middle-Eastern dominance, there would be little that the Trump Administration would be able to do to stop them. Donald Trump was elected precisely because of public exasperation with military intervention in the Middle-East, and President Trump is beholden to that national mood. Only in Iraq and Afghanistan would President Trump be allowed to intervene militarily, and that because of the US' past sacrifices there. All of these factors create a considerable opening for Iran and China in the Arabian Gulf.

Unfortunately, the Trump Administration's strategy of bringing Gulf kingdoms and Israel together in its absence only increases the likelihood that China will acquire the Arabian Gulf. Israeli peace with the UAE and Bahrain certainly seems an historic achievement in the short term, but in the long term it brings a day of reckoning for neighbouring Saudi Arabia.

Mohammed Bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, serves as an almost identical case study to the Shah of Iran. MBS is autocratic, warm in his approach to Israel, not favoured by the religious establishment, facing economic uncertainty at home and is helping the US police the region. Israeli peace with the UAE and Bahrain certainly would not have happened without tacit approval from MBS; should he become king and also make peace with Israel, it is highly likely to backfire.

In few ways would this backfiring be more evident than with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia's close military ally. As China and the US have been carving up their spheres of influence, Saudi Arabia has drifted closer to the US, India and Israel, while Pakistan has found itself even more closely aligned with China. Should Saudi Arabia erupt in instability, it is likely that China and Iran would apply sizable pressure on Pakistan to renege on its military commitments to Saudi Arabia. Close Saudi ties with both India and Israel only increases the likelihood of Pakistani neutrality in the face of Saudi instability.

Should Arabia join the Chinese-Iranian sphere of influence, it would have a decisive impact on the region. Iraq would take Saudi Arabia's place as the foremost US regional priority after Israel, and driving Iran out of Iraq would become an even more urgent priority than it is today. After Israel and Iraq, Afghanistan would be the US' next highest priority, as through Afghanistan the US would be able to apply pressure on both Iran and Pakistan.

With China dominating Iran, Arabia and Pakistan, the Middle-East would become even more volatile and unpredictable. China would dominate both sides of the Arabian Gulf, and Iraq, Jordan and the smaller Gulf kingdoms would all be on the front line against an increasingly belligerent China.

Why the US will return to Afghanistan

As the United States continues to strategically relocate assets to the Pacific, China, Iran and the Taliban will move to take down the Afghan government. As with Iraq in 2014, the situation in Afghanistan will become so untenable that the United States will have no choice but to return.

The impending US withdrawal from Afghanistan is only temporary, and that because of China and Iran.

In defeating its strategic adversaries, the Trump Administration has proven itself effective. With Iran, the US has withdrawn from the 2015 nuclear deal and measured sanctions against the nation, as well as against its proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The US' top regional priority - apart from preventing Iran's nuclear capabilities - is to force Iran out of Iraq and to realign Iraq completely with US' interests, which is likely to be achieved in the long-term - but only if President Trump is reelected in November.

With China, the Trump Administration has backed up tough talk with tough actions. President Trump angered Beijing by calling Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen after his 2016 election win and has bolstered America's position in the South China Sea, with its Pacific allies and with Taiwan. While hostility between the US and China was largely contained to a trade war, the outbreak of Covid-19 now threatens to push the two superpowers to the brink of Cold War. If the two economies decouple and a Second Cold War ensues, it will bring several global hot spots to breaking point.

Nowhere is this more evident than Afghanistan. The Taliban and Afghan government are close to beginning negotiations, and if the Taliban play along, within 14 months the United States could completely withdraw from Afghanistan. While the United States is in Afghanistan it is unlikely the Taliban will push too far militarily - but once the Americans have withdrawn, the Taliban will fight to take down the Afghan government.

Adding China and Iran to the geopolitical calculus makes this outcome even more likely. In addition to sanctions, the assassination of Qassem Soleimani has humiliated and weakened Iran, and threatens its assets in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria as never before. China, too, is growing increasingly alarmed by the movement of US military and sanctions against it, and has touted a strategic partnership with Iran to counter the emerging US threat.

Should President Trump be reelected in November, China and Iran would move ahead on a strategic partnership and, after this, China would apply pressure on Tehran to unilaterally support the Afghan Taliban. Though a Salafi Sunni extremist group, the Taliban has been used at various times by Iran to send its message to the Afghan government and to the US. With a China-Iran strategic partnership sealed, Iran would be required by China to withdraw its support for the Afghan government, to force the United States' hand.

For the US and Afghanistan, Iran's appointment of Esmail Qaani as new Quds Force commander ought to serve as another clear warning. Esmail Qaani has a long history of funnelling Iranian weapons into Afghanistan for both the Taliban and the government - with Iran vowing vengeance against the US for assassinating Qassem Soleimani, Qaani's predecessor, supporting the Taliban to bring down the US allied government in Kabul would be one of the easiest ways to send that message.

For China and Iran, the benefits to US re-engagement with Afghanistan would be substantial. The Taliban is a security threat to both China and Iran - initially funding them to compel the US to return allows two of their enemies to be preoccupied with each other. It gives Iran and China more favourability with Pakistan; it gives the Trump Administration less room for military maneuver in support of Taiwan; it proves Iran is capable of striking back against the US for the death of Soleimani and, most importantly of all, it provides China and Iran with new opportunities for Middle-Eastern dominance.

President Trump is an unpredictable adversary - but one thing both Iran and China can count on is his America First approach. Both nations know that, after Iraq and Afghanistan, the American people would almost under no circumstances support another sizable Middle-Eastern war, and President Trump is beholden to that national mood. Worse still: because of the sacrifices already made in Iraq and Afghanistan, they remain foremost regional priority for the Trump Administration.

Lebanon is most immediately at risk. The current Lebanese ruling class are likely to be overthrown by the protesters; after this occurs Hezbollah, with Chinese and Iranian support, will sit in waiting for the right opportunity to take over the country. With the US occupied in Afghanistan and Iraq, only Israel would stand in the way of Hezbollah taking control of Lebanon.

On the other hand, if Saudi Arabia erupts in civil war, the United States would be unable to help and would be forced to rely on Egypt, the GCC and Israel to intervene in its stead. Should Mohammed Bin Salman be made king and also make rapprochement with Israel, there is a good chance Pakistan would stay neutral in a Saudi civil war. Pakistan is not only indebted to China and moving away from US influence; the strengthening Indian-Saudi ties also plays a significant factor.

But should China and Iran punish the Trump Administration in Afghanistan, President Trump's unpredictability would work against them. President Trump might decide to bring its Indo-Pacific partners with it into Afghanistan, to serve as a training ground. Giving Pacific nations like Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and India battle experience in Afghanistan could be one way to send a message to China about the potential cost for invading Taiwan.

The Trump Administration also might, additionally, thaw relations with Russia, through mutual partners India and Turkey. A thaw in US-Russian relations could lock Iran and China out of Afghanistan, while the US and Russia would divide influence between them. Then Afghanistan would no longer be the front line in the war on terror, but a new and deadly battleground in the Second Cold War.

The China-Iran Deal: Khamenei's Grand Vision

 

After losing Qassem Soleimani, Ayatollah Khamenei decided that if his regime is to collapse, it will be Chinese Communism, not US democracy, that inherits Iran.

Although the signed Nuclear Deal of 2015 initially gave Iran sanctions relief, the arrival of President Donald Trump snapped US sanctions back into place and returned the two nations to previous levels of hostility. As tensions escalated, the United States largely abstained from retaliation - until assassinating Qassem Soleimani, the man largely perceived to be second-in-command of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The assassination was embarrassing for the Islamic Republic. It has had a catastrophic impact on Iran's ability to retain influence in Iraq and might additionally see the end of the current Iran-friendly administration in Lebanon. To make matters worse: Qassem Soleimani was the most popular figure of the Islamic Republic - with him gone, the Iranian people will be more hostile than ever towards the regime. On all fronts, the US is defeating Iran.

But earlier this year a draft of a comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Iran was leaked to the international press. Though condemned by many in Iran's political sphere, it is unlikely to be the work of Hassan Rouhani, the Iranian President. It is far more likely to have been designed by the true authority, Ayatollah Khamenei, because for the Ayatollah, if Iran must compromise, it cannot and will not compromise with the murderers of Qassem Soleimani. Instead, it will compromise with China, another regime almost as hellbent on destroying America as Iran.

Increasingly, Iran and China are likely to work as strategic partners in all matters US-related. Particularly concerning for the US is the potential for the Taliban to join this Chinese-Iranian axis. Such an outcome would erupt Afghanistan into flames after the withdrawal of US forces. The United States would be forced to return to Afghanistan within a couple years, as with Iraq in 2014, and the US would be sufficiently distracted while Iran and China make consolidations elsewhere.

Although stoking the flames in Afghanistan is ideal for China, it would further the risk of war between Iran and the US. That said, it is very unlikely that President Donald Trump would ever go to war with Iran - but under the new strategic partnership, Iran is much more likely to be forced by China into fully supporting the Taliban and completely rejecting the US-backed Afghan government, which would force the US and Iran into yet another dangerous war by proxy.

In return, China would likely support an Iran-Hezbollah-backed coup on Lebanon. As mentioned in a previous article, as the economic situation in Lebanon gets worse, it becomes increasingly likely that Hezbollah will end up ruling the Arab nation. With Chinese support behind Iran and Hezbollah; with Afghanistan in flames and with Taiwan at increasing risk of Chinese invasion, there would be little appetite from the US to wage war with Hezbollah in Lebanon:

https://jwaveruspolitics.blogspot.com/2020/08/bankrupt-lebanon-to-be-ruled-by.html 

In spite of the mutual benefits for both China and Iran, Iran's independence will eventually be eroded and China will become the dominant partner. Yet even should the Islamic Republic be overthrown, their creed, "death to America, death to Israel" will live on in an Iran ruled by Chinese Communism.

Bankrupt Lebanon to be ruled by Hezbollah - analysis

It is no secret that the Syrian Arab Army occupied Lebanon for 29 years. But Hezbollah and Iran actively participating in the Syrian Civil War ensures that Syria will not return to Lebanon - Hezbollah and Iran, however, will.

In 1976 during the brutal Lebanese civil war, the Syrian Arab Army sent a large occupying force into Lebanon to stabilize the situation. Even after the civil war's completion in 1990, the Syrian government kept military control of Lebanon for the next 15 years, greatly frustrating certain elements of Lebanon's political apparatus until Syria's withdrawal in 2005.

But the Syrian Civil War (2011 - present) has changed the strategic calculus. Hezbollah, an important part of the unofficial Lebanese political-military structure, joined the Syrian Arab Army in an attempt to prevent the collapse of the Syrian government. After Russian involvement turned the tide in favour of President Assad, Hezbollah wielded an enormous amount of influence in both Syria and Lebanon.

To challenge this emerging strategic threat, the Trump Administration has prevented Lebanon from receiving any further economic bailouts until they first sever ties with Hezbollah. This has greatly exacerbated an already unstable economic condition. More than this, however: it has sowed the seeds of animosity between Lebanon and Hezbollah. Such animosity within Lebanon already started to show after Hezbollah took a side in the Syrian Civil War. In the eyes of the Arab world, this turned Hezbollah from an anti-Israeli organization into an anti-Sunni Muslim organization. Economic crises which can be directly blamed on Hezbollah threatens to bring the organization and the Lebanese people to breaking point.

All of this changes Hezbollah's calculus considerably. Israel is already putting pressure on all Iran-affiliated militias to not settle on Syria's Israeli border - should Lebanon go bankrupt, military might may indeed once again occupy Lebanon - but not the weakened Syrian Arab Army. Hezbollah's influence in Syria may indeed have bought it legitimacy from the Syrian government to act on its behalf and stabilize Lebanon militarily.

For Hezbollah to militarily occupy all of Lebanon, it would need to at least partially - if not completely - withdraw from Syria. For Iran, a withdrawal of Hezbollah from Syria could be part of a larger deal with Russia: Hezbollah hands over its control of Syria to Russia, on the condition of Russian support for a Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon.

Though a Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon does pose a significant risk to Israel, for the Trump Administration it would legitimize its maximum pressure strategy on Iran and help reveal to more of the Arab world just how malevolent Iranian influence is in the region. The takeover of Lebanon would, additionally, further weaken Iranian influence in Iraq - which is one of the Trump Administration's top priorities - as Iraqis would respond with fury, fearing the same thing would happen in Iraq at the hands of the Popular Mobilization Forces.

All of this would mean that the Trump Administration's top priority concerning Iran - weakening Iran's hold on Iraq - would be accomplished. Hezbollah's occupation of Lebanon may indeed signal the beginning of the end of Iranian influence in Iraq, and force Iran to consolidate its power in Lebanon and Syria at Iraq's expense.

For the Lebanese people, however, misery would ensue. A Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon would be under crippling sanctions, and with the likely loss of Baghdad to ensue, Iran's new centre of influence in the Arab world would be Lebanon and Beirut, and Hassan Nasrallah would become the Arab equivalent of Ayatollah Khomeini.

China, Iran and Afghanistan to collide: Trump's great test

Animosity between China and the United States has provided a much-needed lifeline for Iran. Further, increased Sino-Iranian cooperation could be disastrous for US policy in Afghanistan.

Until 2020, relations between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and the Trump Administration had been strained but respectful. The two superpowers found common ground on North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq and on an emerging trade deal. But the global pandemic of Covid-19 effectively destroyed US-Sino relations, and have the potential to throw the two superpowers into a Second Cold War.

But Hong Kong, Taiwan and the South China Sea are not the only arenas likely to be impacted by a Second Cold War. Iran is perhaps the United States' most imminent threat to its vision for the Middle-East, and China has important reasons to strike a strategic alliance with Iran, even at the risk of losing oil revenue from Gulf states like Saudi Arabia.

Apart from vengeance against the Trump Administration, the other crucial reason for increased Sino-Iranian relations would be to erode Indian influence. India has enjoyed warm relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran but is an adversary of China. China cutting into India's relations with Iran would be a big blow, as India would be locked out of the wider Central Asian market and forced to side with the US' belligerency towards Iran.

For Iran, too, the calculus with the United States has changed. Before 2020, Iran resisted US pressure but was ultimately likely to strike a new nuclear deal in order to survive economically. But with the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, Iran's prestige suffered a severe blow and a deal with the US has become too humiliating to stomach. Should Donald Trump get reelected, as is likely, Iran would rather strike a deal with Xi's China than with the Trump Administration.

In the event of reelection, China and Iran would be desperate to strike back, and this desperation makes them both likely to explore possible avenues of cooperation with the Taliban. After 2 and a half years of negotiation, the United States has recently concluded a peace deal with the Taliban. The US is to withdraw from Afghanistan and, in exchange, the Taliban has pledged not to let its territory be used for terrorist attacks and has pledged to negotiate with the Afghan government.

Should the Taliban uphold their end of the deal, the United States would withdraw its troops over a 14 month period. During this period, the Taliban are very much likely to comply with US demands and reject any overtures from Iran or China. Yet at the conclusion of these 14 months, the Taliban is likely to agree to Iranian and Chinese overtures, and the mutual benefit would be considerable to all three parties involved.

In this scenario, the US would be forced to return to Afghanistan and be too busy dealing with high levels of instability to turn its military might on Iran or China. It would be comparable to US reentry into Iraq in 2014. Should the US use Pakistan as a conduit into Afghanistan, China would be able to spy on the US through Pakistan and gain a further advantage in the Second Cold War, possibly forcing the United States to look for more expensive routes into Afghanistan.

A Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan would be a great test for President Trump. It would test his ability to find alternate solutions to the Afghan crisis, test his willingness to work with the Taliban, test how far he is willing to punish Iran and China for exacerbating the crisis and, finally, test whether he would strike a deal with a country like Russia to stabilize Afghanistan once and for all.

Will Iran and the United States go to war?

Under the Trump Administration, a military-backed regime change in Iran is almost unthinkable.

Many pundits around the world concluded six months ago that the assassination of Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani would lead to a US-led regime change war on Iran in the Middle-East. But Donald Trump will not jeopardize the reputation of his administration by invading Iran, particularly at a time when hostilities between China and the US are getting more heated and after running on a campaign of ending endless wars.

Most important for understanding a possible conflict between Iran and the United States is examining the scope of US military operations in the region today. The United States is currently committed to stabilizing Iraq, looks as if it will completely withdraw from Syria and is currently negotiating with the Taliban for an exit from Afghanistan.

If there is a war between Iran and the United States in the region, it is most likely to happen either in Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan. In Syria, there is an opportunity for Iran to make a quick victory over US forces concentrated on the Syrian-Iraqi border. But as Iran's strategic partners Syria, Russia and Turkey are all involved, this is the least likely of the three scenarios, as a confrontation might jeopardize Iran's relations with its strategic partners.

War between the US and Iran in Iraq is a more possible scenario, and is frightening. It would lead Iraq into its worst state of conflict yet, worse even than when ISIS invaded in 2014 and, unlike a US invasion of Iran's mainland, would likely result in US victory over the Iranians. The Gulf War of 1991 is a good example of the sort of conflict the US would engage in: in 1991, the US drove Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, destroyed Saddam's military forces but did not invade Iraq and conquer Baghdad. Similarly, a war between Iran and the US in Iraq would drive Iranian proxies and military forces out of Iraq, would destroy Iranian military targets but, after achieving these aims, the US would not proceed to invade Iran.

Afghanistan, however, is where the Iranians and the United States are most likely to engage militarily. Current negotiations look successful between the Taliban and the United States. However, it is possible that with Iranian support, the Taliban would initially agree to the United States' demands until the United States withdraws from Afghanistan. After the withdrawal, the Taliban may indeed march to Kabul and take down the Afghan government.

Such a scenario would propel Afghanistan into its worst instability in decades, and the US would be forced to return to Afghanistan with more military might than ever. But returning to Afghanistan is not straightforward. Since Afghanistan is land-locked, the United States needs entry through a country bordering Afghanistan. Pakistan and Iran both have borders with Afghanistan and have both been hostile to US interests there. Worse, in the midst of a destabilized Afghanistan, the US and Iran might find themselves on opposite ends of an escalated conflict there, with little ability to deescalate tensions.

But unlike in Iraq, an Iran war in Afghanistan gives the advantage to Iran, not to the United States. Iran would not need to invade Afghanistan directly, but merely finance the Taliban to take down the Afghan government. In fact, the Afghan government might secretly negotiate with the Iranians for such a scenario to occur. The Afghan government prefers to have the United States in Afghanistan, and would leverage an Iran-backed Taliban as incentive for the United States to return. That said, an Iran-funded Taliban in Afghanistan is the most possible scenario for US defeat at the hands of Iran.

The Trump Administration will not, under almost any circumstances, invade Iran directly. But as Iran's economy continues to crash, Iran might just decide it has more to gain out of direct military confrontation with the US in a neighbouring country than out of negotiations. This increases the likelihood of more endless war in Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan, and would challenge the Trump Administration's foreign policy as never before.

Cold War 2 meets a burning Middle-East

President Trump's policy of blaming China for Coronavirus and harshly criticizing China for its handling of Hong Kong has the intended effect of lighting what has been dubbed a new Cold War. This article will explore the implications of Cold War 2 for the Middle-East.

If you thought the Middle-East was already burning, it is about to burn a whole lot worse. Geopolitical maneuvering in the Middle-East has been showing a distinct trend, and that trend is in favour of Russia. Once China adds its weight to the Middle-East, the United States will be left on the back foot, having allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia but alienating most other players. Here are some predictions for the Middle-East in the advent of a new Cold War with China:



1) China will help Russia sort out the Syrian Civil War. Progress on the Syrian Civil War has stalled thanks to US sanctions on Iran and sanctions on the Syrian government. It has also stalled because of friction between Turkey and Russia. Still fiercely protective of rebel-held Idlib province, Turkey inflicted damage on Iranian and Syrian targets as they approached Turkish observation posts and has not stopped its rhetoric against Bashar Al-Assad.

But once Cold War 2 begins, Syria is a must-win for China and Russia, as it will shore up Sino-Russian power in the Middle-East and deprive the US of any chance of influence there. Very likely, China will use its powers of persuasion to win Turkey over to the Sino-Russian sphere of influence.

2) China will establish cordial relations with Turkey in absence of the US. US-Turkish relations have been steadily deteriorating since President Barrack Obama decided to use PKK-linked Kurds in the US war with ISIS in Syria. Though President Erdogan was initially optimistic of policy change, President Donald Trump continued to back the Kurds in Syria and forced Erdogan to establish ever closer ties with Russia.

As a result, President Erdogan has bought the S-400 missile defense system from Russia, which is incompatible with US military equipment and would likely cause Turkey, in the long-term, to be expelled from NATO. Though the US has threatened Turkey with sanctions, Chinese entry into the Middle-East gives President Erdogan the perfect opportunity to show itself as an independent player: it could keep the S-400 missile defense system and align itself more closely with China. Should Sino-Turkish relations soar, Turkey would not be seen as Russia's pawn but as a partner on an equal playing field with both China and Russia. This would certainly soften the blow of the loss of influence over Syria, as Chinese-Turkish cooperation would greatly frustrate US intentions with Iran, Syria and the wider region.

3) After US withdrawal, Afghanistan will experience terrible civil war. For war-weary Afghanistan, the worst may be yet to come. Although the Taliban has signed an agreement with the United States, it is unlikely the Taliban will in the long-term keep to that agreement: they are likely to do so until the United States is out of Afghanistan, and then they will likely fight to recapture Kabul from what they see as an American puppet.

The Afghan Taliban is backed by Pakistan which, in turn, is backed by China. Expecting the Taliban to stay quiet in Afghanistan is about as likely as expecting Iraq to stay stable after US withdrawal in 2011. And, like Iraq in 2014, Afghanistan is going to become incredibly unstable and overrun. However, the difference is that the Afghan Taliban are backed by the Chinese.

4) Iran and the US might go to war in Iraq. Neither side wants war - but China might help provoke a conflict between the United States and Iran. The only way this could be accomplished would be through exploiting both countries' interests in Iraq. Should Turkey solidify its partnership with China and Russia, this would only help Iran evade US sanctions, which makes war between the two powers more likely. While the United States is extremely unlikely to ever invade Iran, they might go to war in the Persian Gulf or in Iraq, forcing Iraq into its worst conflict yet.

5) Mohammed Bin Salman's Saudi Arabia will implode. A crashing economy, an authoritarian Crown Prince, public ties with Israel - should King Salman Al-Saud die, Mohammed Bin Salman would be the new Saudi king, and the Arabian tribes would very likely break away. This would see the United States occupying eastern Arabia to protect the oilfields, but would leave Mohammed Bin Salman to recapture the rest of Arabia.

For the war against ISIS, this would be devastating, as many tribes in northern and central Arabia are also found in Iraq and Syria. The Arabian tribes would be pulled into the ISIS ideology with even more fervor than has been seen thus far in the Syrian-Iraqi conflict. The frightening scenario of ISIS taking control of Mecca and Medina is no laughing matter, and is a possibility should Saudi Arabia become the latest stage of a proxy war between the United States and China. If China succeeds in winning Turkey over to the Sino-Russian axis, Turkey would likely have no qualms about using ISIS to crush Mohammed Bin Salman. It tried a similar policy in Syria. Such a daring idea could even see Turkish influence expanded to Arabia in the name of fighting ISIS.


Should China engage in the Middle-East to fight in proxy wars with the United States, the whole region would be brought from breaking point to something even worse. Unfortunately for them, the worst of the fighting is definitely yet to come.

The Fracturing of Iran's Shi'ite Crescent

Although the recent sanctions of the US Congress' Caesar Act are targeted against the Syrian Arab Republic, US President Donald Trump's intended targets may be Iraq and Iran.

President Trump has criticized both George W. Bush and Barrack Obama for their handling of Iraq during their presidencies: for George Bush, it was for the initial invasion in 2003; for Barrack Obama it was for the way he withdrew from Iraq in 2011. President Trump has shown a markedly different Iraq policy - one centered on strong, firm support for Iraq while antagonizing Iran.

Previous rounds of sanctions on Iran led by the Trump Administration forced the people of Iraq and Lebanon out in protest against their Iran-backed governments and economic mismanagement. In Lebanon, they have frayed Hezbollah's control and may yet change the political status quo. In Iraq, protests have shocked Iraq's government to its core and, eventually, are likely to inspire regime change more in favour of the autocratic wing of the Middle-East (UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia) and less in favour of Iran. Together with the death of Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani in January this year, things are looking dire for Iran's Shi'ite Crescent.

Due to economic support from China and Russia, sanctions against the Syrian Arab Republic are unlikely to force Bashar Al-Assad out of office or bankrupt his regime. For Iran, however, the already dire economic situation from Tehran to Beirut is made even more so, and is likely to require Iran to make a further strategic withdrawal from the Middle-East.

Iraq is likely where Iran will have to make their concessions first. Increasingly, Baghdad and the Shi'ite Arab south will not be a place welcome for the Shi'ite militias of Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi. Although the militias were popular in their fight against ISIS, Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi have worked hard to make sure that they remain well paid for throughout the sanctions, alienating them from Iraqi protesters who do not share such a luxury.

Should Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi be forced out of Iraq's south, the militias are likely to be sent into the Sunni Arab and Kurdish regions nominally controlled by the Iraqi Army. There the Sunni Arabs and ethnically mixed lands near Kirkuk would be unable to protest their presence as the Shi'ite south has done and, at a pinch, Iran would still be able to make sure its land corridor from Tehran to Beirut remains well protected.

Yet unlike in Iraq, Syrians do not protest the Iran-backed militias. Either they are too frightened to by the apparatus of the Assad regime, or they are grateful for the role the militias played in freeing their country from civil war. As Russia, Turkey and Iran reach a political settlement which solidifies Assad's hold on the nation, this Syrian patriotism for Iran and its proxies is likely to be stirred up even further.

But today, the Shi'ite Arabs of Lebanon and Iraq protest Iranian proxies. After 5-10 more years of US sanctions, it is not hard to see that Hezbollah and Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi might even be forced out of these regions altogether: not by war, but by economic necessity. Intriguingly, once bankrupt, the Iranian proxies of the Arab world might flee to Syria to live in refuge, as the Syrian Arab Republic would be more immune to sanctions due to Sino-Russian support.

The exile of Hezbollah from Lebanon and Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi militias from Iraq may currently seem a remote possibility, but two years ago widespread protests in Lebanon and Iraq against Iran also seemed a remote possibility. President Trump's lasting legacy for the region may indeed be a pro-American Iraq, a defanged Lebanon and a Syria dominated by Iran's proxies.