Tuesday, 23 June 2020
The Fracturing of Iran's Shi'ite Crescent
Although the recent sanctions of the US Congress' Caesar Act are targeted against the Syrian Arab Republic, US President Donald Trump's intended targets may be Iraq and Iran.
President Trump has criticized both George W. Bush and Barrack Obama for their handling of Iraq during their presidencies: for George Bush, it was for the initial invasion in 2003; for Barrack Obama it was for the way he withdrew from Iraq in 2011. President Trump has shown a markedly different Iraq policy - one centered on strong, firm support for Iraq while antagonizing Iran.
Previous rounds of sanctions on Iran led by the Trump Administration forced the people of Iraq and Lebanon out in protest against their Iran-backed governments and economic mismanagement. In Lebanon, they have frayed Hezbollah's control and may yet change the political status quo. In Iraq, protests have shocked Iraq's government to its core and, eventually, are likely to inspire regime change more in favour of the autocratic wing of the Middle-East (UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia) and less in favour of Iran. Together with the death of Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani in January this year, things are looking dire for Iran's Shi'ite Crescent.
Due to economic support from China and Russia, sanctions against the Syrian Arab Republic are unlikely to force Bashar Al-Assad out of office or bankrupt his regime. For Iran, however, the already dire economic situation from Tehran to Beirut is made even more so, and is likely to require Iran to make a further strategic withdrawal from the Middle-East.
Iraq is likely where Iran will have to make their concessions first. Increasingly, Baghdad and the Shi'ite Arab south will not be a place welcome for the Shi'ite militias of Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi. Although the militias were popular in their fight against ISIS, Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi have worked hard to make sure that they remain well paid for throughout the sanctions, alienating them from Iraqi protesters who do not share such a luxury.
Should Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi be forced out of Iraq's south, the militias are likely to be sent into the Sunni Arab and Kurdish regions nominally controlled by the Iraqi Army. There the Sunni Arabs and ethnically mixed lands near Kirkuk would be unable to protest their presence as the Shi'ite south has done and, at a pinch, Iran would still be able to make sure its land corridor from Tehran to Beirut remains well protected.
Yet unlike in Iraq, Syrians do not protest the Iran-backed militias. Either they are too frightened to by the apparatus of the Assad regime, or they are grateful for the role the militias played in freeing their country from civil war. As Russia, Turkey and Iran reach a political settlement which solidifies Assad's hold on the nation, this Syrian patriotism for Iran and its proxies is likely to be stirred up even further.
But today, the Shi'ite Arabs of Lebanon and Iraq protest Iranian proxies. After 5-10 more years of US sanctions, it is not hard to see that Hezbollah and Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi might even be forced out of these regions altogether: not by war, but by economic necessity. Intriguingly, once bankrupt, the Iranian proxies of the Arab world might flee to Syria to live in refuge, as the Syrian Arab Republic would be more immune to sanctions due to Sino-Russian support.
The exile of Hezbollah from Lebanon and Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi militias from Iraq may currently seem a remote possibility, but two years ago widespread protests in Lebanon and Iraq against Iran also seemed a remote possibility. President Trump's lasting legacy for the region may indeed be a pro-American Iraq, a defanged Lebanon and a Syria dominated by Iran's proxies.
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