The Arabian Gulf: the coming calamity

US pivot to the Pacific; Gulf kingdoms' ties with Israel; Iraqi and Afghan priorities; an Iranian-Chinese strategic partnership - all of these factors increase the likelihood of the US losing its dominance of the Arabian Gulf.

As with Iran in 1979, the United States once again faces the likelihood of losing a large portion of influence in the Middle-East.

The 1979 revolution did not happen by accident. By the late 1960's staunch US ally Britain was no longer willing to maintain its superpower status and made a strategic withdrawal from the global stage. To make up for Britain's absence, the US increasingly relied on the Shah of Iran to help it police the region. Unfortunately, core financial issues coupled with strong relations with Israel left Iran ripe for Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution and forced the Shah out of power.

Similarly to Britain 60 years ago, under Donald Trump the United States is looking to make a strategic withdrawal, particularly from the Middle-East and from Europe. At the same time, the US is focusing its military assets on the Pacific and ramping up pressure on adversaries China and Iran. While the US is certainly likely to prevent Chinese dominance in the Pacific, its simultaneous pressure on Iran and China gives both nations a timely opportunity for Middle-Eastern dominance.

Earlier this year a draft of a strategic partnership between China and Iran was leaked to the international press. If Donald Trump is reelected President, it is highly likely the two powers would implement the partnership and ignite Cold War 2 with the United States. In such a scenario, China would not need to invade Taiwan to defeat the US; instead, China would be able to apply sizeable pressure on the US in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and the Arabian Gulf through its partnership with Iran - to deadly effect.

Should China back Iran's efforts for Middle-Eastern dominance, there would be little that the Trump Administration would be able to do to stop them. Donald Trump was elected precisely because of public exasperation with military intervention in the Middle-East, and President Trump is beholden to that national mood. Only in Iraq and Afghanistan would President Trump be allowed to intervene militarily, and that because of the US' past sacrifices there. All of these factors create a considerable opening for Iran and China in the Arabian Gulf.

Unfortunately, the Trump Administration's strategy of bringing Gulf kingdoms and Israel together in its absence only increases the likelihood that China will acquire the Arabian Gulf. Israeli peace with the UAE and Bahrain certainly seems an historic achievement in the short term, but in the long term it brings a day of reckoning for neighbouring Saudi Arabia.

Mohammed Bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, serves as an almost identical case study to the Shah of Iran. MBS is autocratic, warm in his approach to Israel, not favoured by the religious establishment, facing economic uncertainty at home and is helping the US police the region. Israeli peace with the UAE and Bahrain certainly would not have happened without tacit approval from MBS; should he become king and also make peace with Israel, it is highly likely to backfire.

In few ways would this backfiring be more evident than with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia's close military ally. As China and the US have been carving up their spheres of influence, Saudi Arabia has drifted closer to the US, India and Israel, while Pakistan has found itself even more closely aligned with China. Should Saudi Arabia erupt in instability, it is likely that China and Iran would apply sizable pressure on Pakistan to renege on its military commitments to Saudi Arabia. Close Saudi ties with both India and Israel only increases the likelihood of Pakistani neutrality in the face of Saudi instability.

Should Arabia join the Chinese-Iranian sphere of influence, it would have a decisive impact on the region. Iraq would take Saudi Arabia's place as the foremost US regional priority after Israel, and driving Iran out of Iraq would become an even more urgent priority than it is today. After Israel and Iraq, Afghanistan would be the US' next highest priority, as through Afghanistan the US would be able to apply pressure on both Iran and Pakistan.

With China dominating Iran, Arabia and Pakistan, the Middle-East would become even more volatile and unpredictable. China would dominate both sides of the Arabian Gulf, and Iraq, Jordan and the smaller Gulf kingdoms would all be on the front line against an increasingly belligerent China.

Why the US will return to Afghanistan

As the United States continues to strategically relocate assets to the Pacific, China, Iran and the Taliban will move to take down the Afghan government. As with Iraq in 2014, the situation in Afghanistan will become so untenable that the United States will have no choice but to return.

The impending US withdrawal from Afghanistan is only temporary, and that because of China and Iran.

In defeating its strategic adversaries, the Trump Administration has proven itself effective. With Iran, the US has withdrawn from the 2015 nuclear deal and measured sanctions against the nation, as well as against its proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The US' top regional priority - apart from preventing Iran's nuclear capabilities - is to force Iran out of Iraq and to realign Iraq completely with US' interests, which is likely to be achieved in the long-term - but only if President Trump is reelected in November.

With China, the Trump Administration has backed up tough talk with tough actions. President Trump angered Beijing by calling Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen after his 2016 election win and has bolstered America's position in the South China Sea, with its Pacific allies and with Taiwan. While hostility between the US and China was largely contained to a trade war, the outbreak of Covid-19 now threatens to push the two superpowers to the brink of Cold War. If the two economies decouple and a Second Cold War ensues, it will bring several global hot spots to breaking point.

Nowhere is this more evident than Afghanistan. The Taliban and Afghan government are close to beginning negotiations, and if the Taliban play along, within 14 months the United States could completely withdraw from Afghanistan. While the United States is in Afghanistan it is unlikely the Taliban will push too far militarily - but once the Americans have withdrawn, the Taliban will fight to take down the Afghan government.

Adding China and Iran to the geopolitical calculus makes this outcome even more likely. In addition to sanctions, the assassination of Qassem Soleimani has humiliated and weakened Iran, and threatens its assets in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria as never before. China, too, is growing increasingly alarmed by the movement of US military and sanctions against it, and has touted a strategic partnership with Iran to counter the emerging US threat.

Should President Trump be reelected in November, China and Iran would move ahead on a strategic partnership and, after this, China would apply pressure on Tehran to unilaterally support the Afghan Taliban. Though a Salafi Sunni extremist group, the Taliban has been used at various times by Iran to send its message to the Afghan government and to the US. With a China-Iran strategic partnership sealed, Iran would be required by China to withdraw its support for the Afghan government, to force the United States' hand.

For the US and Afghanistan, Iran's appointment of Esmail Qaani as new Quds Force commander ought to serve as another clear warning. Esmail Qaani has a long history of funnelling Iranian weapons into Afghanistan for both the Taliban and the government - with Iran vowing vengeance against the US for assassinating Qassem Soleimani, Qaani's predecessor, supporting the Taliban to bring down the US allied government in Kabul would be one of the easiest ways to send that message.

For China and Iran, the benefits to US re-engagement with Afghanistan would be substantial. The Taliban is a security threat to both China and Iran - initially funding them to compel the US to return allows two of their enemies to be preoccupied with each other. It gives Iran and China more favourability with Pakistan; it gives the Trump Administration less room for military maneuver in support of Taiwan; it proves Iran is capable of striking back against the US for the death of Soleimani and, most importantly of all, it provides China and Iran with new opportunities for Middle-Eastern dominance.

President Trump is an unpredictable adversary - but one thing both Iran and China can count on is his America First approach. Both nations know that, after Iraq and Afghanistan, the American people would almost under no circumstances support another sizable Middle-Eastern war, and President Trump is beholden to that national mood. Worse still: because of the sacrifices already made in Iraq and Afghanistan, they remain foremost regional priority for the Trump Administration.

Lebanon is most immediately at risk. The current Lebanese ruling class are likely to be overthrown by the protesters; after this occurs Hezbollah, with Chinese and Iranian support, will sit in waiting for the right opportunity to take over the country. With the US occupied in Afghanistan and Iraq, only Israel would stand in the way of Hezbollah taking control of Lebanon.

On the other hand, if Saudi Arabia erupts in civil war, the United States would be unable to help and would be forced to rely on Egypt, the GCC and Israel to intervene in its stead. Should Mohammed Bin Salman be made king and also make rapprochement with Israel, there is a good chance Pakistan would stay neutral in a Saudi civil war. Pakistan is not only indebted to China and moving away from US influence; the strengthening Indian-Saudi ties also plays a significant factor.

But should China and Iran punish the Trump Administration in Afghanistan, President Trump's unpredictability would work against them. President Trump might decide to bring its Indo-Pacific partners with it into Afghanistan, to serve as a training ground. Giving Pacific nations like Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and India battle experience in Afghanistan could be one way to send a message to China about the potential cost for invading Taiwan.

The Trump Administration also might, additionally, thaw relations with Russia, through mutual partners India and Turkey. A thaw in US-Russian relations could lock Iran and China out of Afghanistan, while the US and Russia would divide influence between them. Then Afghanistan would no longer be the front line in the war on terror, but a new and deadly battleground in the Second Cold War.