Cold War 2 meets a burning Middle-East

President Trump's policy of blaming China for Coronavirus and harshly criticizing China for its handling of Hong Kong has the intended effect of lighting what has been dubbed a new Cold War. This article will explore the implications of Cold War 2 for the Middle-East.

If you thought the Middle-East was already burning, it is about to burn a whole lot worse. Geopolitical maneuvering in the Middle-East has been showing a distinct trend, and that trend is in favour of Russia. Once China adds its weight to the Middle-East, the United States will be left on the back foot, having allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia but alienating most other players. Here are some predictions for the Middle-East in the advent of a new Cold War with China:



1) China will help Russia sort out the Syrian Civil War. Progress on the Syrian Civil War has stalled thanks to US sanctions on Iran and sanctions on the Syrian government. It has also stalled because of friction between Turkey and Russia. Still fiercely protective of rebel-held Idlib province, Turkey inflicted damage on Iranian and Syrian targets as they approached Turkish observation posts and has not stopped its rhetoric against Bashar Al-Assad.

But once Cold War 2 begins, Syria is a must-win for China and Russia, as it will shore up Sino-Russian power in the Middle-East and deprive the US of any chance of influence there. Very likely, China will use its powers of persuasion to win Turkey over to the Sino-Russian sphere of influence.

2) China will establish cordial relations with Turkey in absence of the US. US-Turkish relations have been steadily deteriorating since President Barrack Obama decided to use PKK-linked Kurds in the US war with ISIS in Syria. Though President Erdogan was initially optimistic of policy change, President Donald Trump continued to back the Kurds in Syria and forced Erdogan to establish ever closer ties with Russia.

As a result, President Erdogan has bought the S-400 missile defense system from Russia, which is incompatible with US military equipment and would likely cause Turkey, in the long-term, to be expelled from NATO. Though the US has threatened Turkey with sanctions, Chinese entry into the Middle-East gives President Erdogan the perfect opportunity to show itself as an independent player: it could keep the S-400 missile defense system and align itself more closely with China. Should Sino-Turkish relations soar, Turkey would not be seen as Russia's pawn but as a partner on an equal playing field with both China and Russia. This would certainly soften the blow of the loss of influence over Syria, as Chinese-Turkish cooperation would greatly frustrate US intentions with Iran, Syria and the wider region.

3) After US withdrawal, Afghanistan will experience terrible civil war. For war-weary Afghanistan, the worst may be yet to come. Although the Taliban has signed an agreement with the United States, it is unlikely the Taliban will in the long-term keep to that agreement: they are likely to do so until the United States is out of Afghanistan, and then they will likely fight to recapture Kabul from what they see as an American puppet.

The Afghan Taliban is backed by Pakistan which, in turn, is backed by China. Expecting the Taliban to stay quiet in Afghanistan is about as likely as expecting Iraq to stay stable after US withdrawal in 2011. And, like Iraq in 2014, Afghanistan is going to become incredibly unstable and overrun. However, the difference is that the Afghan Taliban are backed by the Chinese.

4) Iran and the US might go to war in Iraq. Neither side wants war - but China might help provoke a conflict between the United States and Iran. The only way this could be accomplished would be through exploiting both countries' interests in Iraq. Should Turkey solidify its partnership with China and Russia, this would only help Iran evade US sanctions, which makes war between the two powers more likely. While the United States is extremely unlikely to ever invade Iran, they might go to war in the Persian Gulf or in Iraq, forcing Iraq into its worst conflict yet.

5) Mohammed Bin Salman's Saudi Arabia will implode. A crashing economy, an authoritarian Crown Prince, public ties with Israel - should King Salman Al-Saud die, Mohammed Bin Salman would be the new Saudi king, and the Arabian tribes would very likely break away. This would see the United States occupying eastern Arabia to protect the oilfields, but would leave Mohammed Bin Salman to recapture the rest of Arabia.

For the war against ISIS, this would be devastating, as many tribes in northern and central Arabia are also found in Iraq and Syria. The Arabian tribes would be pulled into the ISIS ideology with even more fervor than has been seen thus far in the Syrian-Iraqi conflict. The frightening scenario of ISIS taking control of Mecca and Medina is no laughing matter, and is a possibility should Saudi Arabia become the latest stage of a proxy war between the United States and China. If China succeeds in winning Turkey over to the Sino-Russian axis, Turkey would likely have no qualms about using ISIS to crush Mohammed Bin Salman. It tried a similar policy in Syria. Such a daring idea could even see Turkish influence expanded to Arabia in the name of fighting ISIS.


Should China engage in the Middle-East to fight in proxy wars with the United States, the whole region would be brought from breaking point to something even worse. Unfortunately for them, the worst of the fighting is definitely yet to come.

The Fracturing of Iran's Shi'ite Crescent

Although the recent sanctions of the US Congress' Caesar Act are targeted against the Syrian Arab Republic, US President Donald Trump's intended targets may be Iraq and Iran.

President Trump has criticized both George W. Bush and Barrack Obama for their handling of Iraq during their presidencies: for George Bush, it was for the initial invasion in 2003; for Barrack Obama it was for the way he withdrew from Iraq in 2011. President Trump has shown a markedly different Iraq policy - one centered on strong, firm support for Iraq while antagonizing Iran.

Previous rounds of sanctions on Iran led by the Trump Administration forced the people of Iraq and Lebanon out in protest against their Iran-backed governments and economic mismanagement. In Lebanon, they have frayed Hezbollah's control and may yet change the political status quo. In Iraq, protests have shocked Iraq's government to its core and, eventually, are likely to inspire regime change more in favour of the autocratic wing of the Middle-East (UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia) and less in favour of Iran. Together with the death of Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani in January this year, things are looking dire for Iran's Shi'ite Crescent.

Due to economic support from China and Russia, sanctions against the Syrian Arab Republic are unlikely to force Bashar Al-Assad out of office or bankrupt his regime. For Iran, however, the already dire economic situation from Tehran to Beirut is made even more so, and is likely to require Iran to make a further strategic withdrawal from the Middle-East.

Iraq is likely where Iran will have to make their concessions first. Increasingly, Baghdad and the Shi'ite Arab south will not be a place welcome for the Shi'ite militias of Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi. Although the militias were popular in their fight against ISIS, Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi have worked hard to make sure that they remain well paid for throughout the sanctions, alienating them from Iraqi protesters who do not share such a luxury.

Should Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi be forced out of Iraq's south, the militias are likely to be sent into the Sunni Arab and Kurdish regions nominally controlled by the Iraqi Army. There the Sunni Arabs and ethnically mixed lands near Kirkuk would be unable to protest their presence as the Shi'ite south has done and, at a pinch, Iran would still be able to make sure its land corridor from Tehran to Beirut remains well protected.

Yet unlike in Iraq, Syrians do not protest the Iran-backed militias. Either they are too frightened to by the apparatus of the Assad regime, or they are grateful for the role the militias played in freeing their country from civil war. As Russia, Turkey and Iran reach a political settlement which solidifies Assad's hold on the nation, this Syrian patriotism for Iran and its proxies is likely to be stirred up even further.

But today, the Shi'ite Arabs of Lebanon and Iraq protest Iranian proxies. After 5-10 more years of US sanctions, it is not hard to see that Hezbollah and Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi might even be forced out of these regions altogether: not by war, but by economic necessity. Intriguingly, once bankrupt, the Iranian proxies of the Arab world might flee to Syria to live in refuge, as the Syrian Arab Republic would be more immune to sanctions due to Sino-Russian support.

The exile of Hezbollah from Lebanon and Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi militias from Iraq may currently seem a remote possibility, but two years ago widespread protests in Lebanon and Iraq against Iran also seemed a remote possibility. President Trump's lasting legacy for the region may indeed be a pro-American Iraq, a defanged Lebanon and a Syria dominated by Iran's proxies.