China, Iran and Afghanistan to collide: Trump's great test

Animosity between China and the United States has provided a much-needed lifeline for Iran. Further, increased Sino-Iranian cooperation could be disastrous for US policy in Afghanistan.

Until 2020, relations between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and the Trump Administration had been strained but respectful. The two superpowers found common ground on North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq and on an emerging trade deal. But the global pandemic of Covid-19 effectively destroyed US-Sino relations, and have the potential to throw the two superpowers into a Second Cold War.

But Hong Kong, Taiwan and the South China Sea are not the only arenas likely to be impacted by a Second Cold War. Iran is perhaps the United States' most imminent threat to its vision for the Middle-East, and China has important reasons to strike a strategic alliance with Iran, even at the risk of losing oil revenue from Gulf states like Saudi Arabia.

Apart from vengeance against the Trump Administration, the other crucial reason for increased Sino-Iranian relations would be to erode Indian influence. India has enjoyed warm relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran but is an adversary of China. China cutting into India's relations with Iran would be a big blow, as India would be locked out of the wider Central Asian market and forced to side with the US' belligerency towards Iran.

For Iran, too, the calculus with the United States has changed. Before 2020, Iran resisted US pressure but was ultimately likely to strike a new nuclear deal in order to survive economically. But with the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, Iran's prestige suffered a severe blow and a deal with the US has become too humiliating to stomach. Should Donald Trump get reelected, as is likely, Iran would rather strike a deal with Xi's China than with the Trump Administration.

In the event of reelection, China and Iran would be desperate to strike back, and this desperation makes them both likely to explore possible avenues of cooperation with the Taliban. After 2 and a half years of negotiation, the United States has recently concluded a peace deal with the Taliban. The US is to withdraw from Afghanistan and, in exchange, the Taliban has pledged not to let its territory be used for terrorist attacks and has pledged to negotiate with the Afghan government.

Should the Taliban uphold their end of the deal, the United States would withdraw its troops over a 14 month period. During this period, the Taliban are very much likely to comply with US demands and reject any overtures from Iran or China. Yet at the conclusion of these 14 months, the Taliban is likely to agree to Iranian and Chinese overtures, and the mutual benefit would be considerable to all three parties involved.

In this scenario, the US would be forced to return to Afghanistan and be too busy dealing with high levels of instability to turn its military might on Iran or China. It would be comparable to US reentry into Iraq in 2014. Should the US use Pakistan as a conduit into Afghanistan, China would be able to spy on the US through Pakistan and gain a further advantage in the Second Cold War, possibly forcing the United States to look for more expensive routes into Afghanistan.

A Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan would be a great test for President Trump. It would test his ability to find alternate solutions to the Afghan crisis, test his willingness to work with the Taliban, test how far he is willing to punish Iran and China for exacerbating the crisis and, finally, test whether he would strike a deal with a country like Russia to stabilize Afghanistan once and for all.

Will Iran and the United States go to war?

Under the Trump Administration, a military-backed regime change in Iran is almost unthinkable.

Many pundits around the world concluded six months ago that the assassination of Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani would lead to a US-led regime change war on Iran in the Middle-East. But Donald Trump will not jeopardize the reputation of his administration by invading Iran, particularly at a time when hostilities between China and the US are getting more heated and after running on a campaign of ending endless wars.

Most important for understanding a possible conflict between Iran and the United States is examining the scope of US military operations in the region today. The United States is currently committed to stabilizing Iraq, looks as if it will completely withdraw from Syria and is currently negotiating with the Taliban for an exit from Afghanistan.

If there is a war between Iran and the United States in the region, it is most likely to happen either in Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan. In Syria, there is an opportunity for Iran to make a quick victory over US forces concentrated on the Syrian-Iraqi border. But as Iran's strategic partners Syria, Russia and Turkey are all involved, this is the least likely of the three scenarios, as a confrontation might jeopardize Iran's relations with its strategic partners.

War between the US and Iran in Iraq is a more possible scenario, and is frightening. It would lead Iraq into its worst state of conflict yet, worse even than when ISIS invaded in 2014 and, unlike a US invasion of Iran's mainland, would likely result in US victory over the Iranians. The Gulf War of 1991 is a good example of the sort of conflict the US would engage in: in 1991, the US drove Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, destroyed Saddam's military forces but did not invade Iraq and conquer Baghdad. Similarly, a war between Iran and the US in Iraq would drive Iranian proxies and military forces out of Iraq, would destroy Iranian military targets but, after achieving these aims, the US would not proceed to invade Iran.

Afghanistan, however, is where the Iranians and the United States are most likely to engage militarily. Current negotiations look successful between the Taliban and the United States. However, it is possible that with Iranian support, the Taliban would initially agree to the United States' demands until the United States withdraws from Afghanistan. After the withdrawal, the Taliban may indeed march to Kabul and take down the Afghan government.

Such a scenario would propel Afghanistan into its worst instability in decades, and the US would be forced to return to Afghanistan with more military might than ever. But returning to Afghanistan is not straightforward. Since Afghanistan is land-locked, the United States needs entry through a country bordering Afghanistan. Pakistan and Iran both have borders with Afghanistan and have both been hostile to US interests there. Worse, in the midst of a destabilized Afghanistan, the US and Iran might find themselves on opposite ends of an escalated conflict there, with little ability to deescalate tensions.

But unlike in Iraq, an Iran war in Afghanistan gives the advantage to Iran, not to the United States. Iran would not need to invade Afghanistan directly, but merely finance the Taliban to take down the Afghan government. In fact, the Afghan government might secretly negotiate with the Iranians for such a scenario to occur. The Afghan government prefers to have the United States in Afghanistan, and would leverage an Iran-backed Taliban as incentive for the United States to return. That said, an Iran-funded Taliban in Afghanistan is the most possible scenario for US defeat at the hands of Iran.

The Trump Administration will not, under almost any circumstances, invade Iran directly. But as Iran's economy continues to crash, Iran might just decide it has more to gain out of direct military confrontation with the US in a neighbouring country than out of negotiations. This increases the likelihood of more endless war in Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan, and would challenge the Trump Administration's foreign policy as never before.

Cold War 2 meets a burning Middle-East

President Trump's policy of blaming China for Coronavirus and harshly criticizing China for its handling of Hong Kong has the intended effect of lighting what has been dubbed a new Cold War. This article will explore the implications of Cold War 2 for the Middle-East.

If you thought the Middle-East was already burning, it is about to burn a whole lot worse. Geopolitical maneuvering in the Middle-East has been showing a distinct trend, and that trend is in favour of Russia. Once China adds its weight to the Middle-East, the United States will be left on the back foot, having allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia but alienating most other players. Here are some predictions for the Middle-East in the advent of a new Cold War with China:



1) China will help Russia sort out the Syrian Civil War. Progress on the Syrian Civil War has stalled thanks to US sanctions on Iran and sanctions on the Syrian government. It has also stalled because of friction between Turkey and Russia. Still fiercely protective of rebel-held Idlib province, Turkey inflicted damage on Iranian and Syrian targets as they approached Turkish observation posts and has not stopped its rhetoric against Bashar Al-Assad.

But once Cold War 2 begins, Syria is a must-win for China and Russia, as it will shore up Sino-Russian power in the Middle-East and deprive the US of any chance of influence there. Very likely, China will use its powers of persuasion to win Turkey over to the Sino-Russian sphere of influence.

2) China will establish cordial relations with Turkey in absence of the US. US-Turkish relations have been steadily deteriorating since President Barrack Obama decided to use PKK-linked Kurds in the US war with ISIS in Syria. Though President Erdogan was initially optimistic of policy change, President Donald Trump continued to back the Kurds in Syria and forced Erdogan to establish ever closer ties with Russia.

As a result, President Erdogan has bought the S-400 missile defense system from Russia, which is incompatible with US military equipment and would likely cause Turkey, in the long-term, to be expelled from NATO. Though the US has threatened Turkey with sanctions, Chinese entry into the Middle-East gives President Erdogan the perfect opportunity to show itself as an independent player: it could keep the S-400 missile defense system and align itself more closely with China. Should Sino-Turkish relations soar, Turkey would not be seen as Russia's pawn but as a partner on an equal playing field with both China and Russia. This would certainly soften the blow of the loss of influence over Syria, as Chinese-Turkish cooperation would greatly frustrate US intentions with Iran, Syria and the wider region.

3) After US withdrawal, Afghanistan will experience terrible civil war. For war-weary Afghanistan, the worst may be yet to come. Although the Taliban has signed an agreement with the United States, it is unlikely the Taliban will in the long-term keep to that agreement: they are likely to do so until the United States is out of Afghanistan, and then they will likely fight to recapture Kabul from what they see as an American puppet.

The Afghan Taliban is backed by Pakistan which, in turn, is backed by China. Expecting the Taliban to stay quiet in Afghanistan is about as likely as expecting Iraq to stay stable after US withdrawal in 2011. And, like Iraq in 2014, Afghanistan is going to become incredibly unstable and overrun. However, the difference is that the Afghan Taliban are backed by the Chinese.

4) Iran and the US might go to war in Iraq. Neither side wants war - but China might help provoke a conflict between the United States and Iran. The only way this could be accomplished would be through exploiting both countries' interests in Iraq. Should Turkey solidify its partnership with China and Russia, this would only help Iran evade US sanctions, which makes war between the two powers more likely. While the United States is extremely unlikely to ever invade Iran, they might go to war in the Persian Gulf or in Iraq, forcing Iraq into its worst conflict yet.

5) Mohammed Bin Salman's Saudi Arabia will implode. A crashing economy, an authoritarian Crown Prince, public ties with Israel - should King Salman Al-Saud die, Mohammed Bin Salman would be the new Saudi king, and the Arabian tribes would very likely break away. This would see the United States occupying eastern Arabia to protect the oilfields, but would leave Mohammed Bin Salman to recapture the rest of Arabia.

For the war against ISIS, this would be devastating, as many tribes in northern and central Arabia are also found in Iraq and Syria. The Arabian tribes would be pulled into the ISIS ideology with even more fervor than has been seen thus far in the Syrian-Iraqi conflict. The frightening scenario of ISIS taking control of Mecca and Medina is no laughing matter, and is a possibility should Saudi Arabia become the latest stage of a proxy war between the United States and China. If China succeeds in winning Turkey over to the Sino-Russian axis, Turkey would likely have no qualms about using ISIS to crush Mohammed Bin Salman. It tried a similar policy in Syria. Such a daring idea could even see Turkish influence expanded to Arabia in the name of fighting ISIS.


Should China engage in the Middle-East to fight in proxy wars with the United States, the whole region would be brought from breaking point to something even worse. Unfortunately for them, the worst of the fighting is definitely yet to come.

The Fracturing of Iran's Shi'ite Crescent

Although the recent sanctions of the US Congress' Caesar Act are targeted against the Syrian Arab Republic, US President Donald Trump's intended targets may be Iraq and Iran.

President Trump has criticized both George W. Bush and Barrack Obama for their handling of Iraq during their presidencies: for George Bush, it was for the initial invasion in 2003; for Barrack Obama it was for the way he withdrew from Iraq in 2011. President Trump has shown a markedly different Iraq policy - one centered on strong, firm support for Iraq while antagonizing Iran.

Previous rounds of sanctions on Iran led by the Trump Administration forced the people of Iraq and Lebanon out in protest against their Iran-backed governments and economic mismanagement. In Lebanon, they have frayed Hezbollah's control and may yet change the political status quo. In Iraq, protests have shocked Iraq's government to its core and, eventually, are likely to inspire regime change more in favour of the autocratic wing of the Middle-East (UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia) and less in favour of Iran. Together with the death of Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani in January this year, things are looking dire for Iran's Shi'ite Crescent.

Due to economic support from China and Russia, sanctions against the Syrian Arab Republic are unlikely to force Bashar Al-Assad out of office or bankrupt his regime. For Iran, however, the already dire economic situation from Tehran to Beirut is made even more so, and is likely to require Iran to make a further strategic withdrawal from the Middle-East.

Iraq is likely where Iran will have to make their concessions first. Increasingly, Baghdad and the Shi'ite Arab south will not be a place welcome for the Shi'ite militias of Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi. Although the militias were popular in their fight against ISIS, Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi have worked hard to make sure that they remain well paid for throughout the sanctions, alienating them from Iraqi protesters who do not share such a luxury.

Should Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi be forced out of Iraq's south, the militias are likely to be sent into the Sunni Arab and Kurdish regions nominally controlled by the Iraqi Army. There the Sunni Arabs and ethnically mixed lands near Kirkuk would be unable to protest their presence as the Shi'ite south has done and, at a pinch, Iran would still be able to make sure its land corridor from Tehran to Beirut remains well protected.

Yet unlike in Iraq, Syrians do not protest the Iran-backed militias. Either they are too frightened to by the apparatus of the Assad regime, or they are grateful for the role the militias played in freeing their country from civil war. As Russia, Turkey and Iran reach a political settlement which solidifies Assad's hold on the nation, this Syrian patriotism for Iran and its proxies is likely to be stirred up even further.

But today, the Shi'ite Arabs of Lebanon and Iraq protest Iranian proxies. After 5-10 more years of US sanctions, it is not hard to see that Hezbollah and Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi might even be forced out of these regions altogether: not by war, but by economic necessity. Intriguingly, once bankrupt, the Iranian proxies of the Arab world might flee to Syria to live in refuge, as the Syrian Arab Republic would be more immune to sanctions due to Sino-Russian support.

The exile of Hezbollah from Lebanon and Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi militias from Iraq may currently seem a remote possibility, but two years ago widespread protests in Lebanon and Iraq against Iran also seemed a remote possibility. President Trump's lasting legacy for the region may indeed be a pro-American Iraq, a defanged Lebanon and a Syria dominated by Iran's proxies.

Why regime change in Iran won't be pro-US

After leading the charge against Communism for 50 years, the Iraq war and the Afghan war, the last thing the American people want is war and occupation of Iran.

Under President Trump, the United States is waging economic war with a variety of nations - from Asian nations China and North Korea to Russia, Turkey and Pakistan. But nowhere is economic war more focused than against Iran.

The objective of sanctions against Iran, according to President Trump - and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu - is to get a new deal to replace the previous Iran Deal negotiated by Barrack Obama. However, should Iran Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei not comply, the Iranian economy will continue to erode and regime change will be inevitable.

Yet there is no chance Iran will erupt in civil war. Though the Iranian people are frustrated with the current regime, they are more terrified of instability than of Khamenei and the mullahs. Seeing instability in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Libya is the main reason for this.

Like in 1979, the next Iranian revolution will not be bloody. There are two alternatives, and neither of them would be pro-United States.

The first alternative is that Qassem Suleimani will become the next leader of Iran. Should Iranian protests grow and Ali Khamenei order the Quds force to fire on civilians, it is possible that Suleimani will claim Khamanei has lost his Islamic legitimacy and take control of Tehran. Should that occur, it would be a nightmare for the US, Israel and their allies.

The second alternative is that the Iranian army will engage in a military coup against the Iranian regime and take control of Tehran. Military coups are common in the Middle-East, with the most recent one taking place in Egypt in 2013.

In either scenario, relations between Russia and Iran would strengthen and the US would not be able to make inroads. The Middle-East is well aware that the United States has had an incompetent track record in its foreign policy in the region - conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria were all exacerbated by American idealism over any real interest to engage with regional issues.

The most recent example of this would be the United States still calling for a return to the Geneva talks in the Syrian conflict, though Geneva has proven much less successful than the Russia-backed Astana and Sochi talks.

On the other hand, Russia is on the ascendancy in the Middle-East because it has largely cooperated with regional actors and sought the best for each nation on balance. For Syria, Iran, Turkey and Israel, Russia under President Putin has engaged in delicate diplomacy to provide the best needs for each regional actor in the context of the Syrian crisis. First and foremost, it has restored control of Syria to the Syrian Arab Army and has cleared out the majority of the region from ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

For Israel, Russia has made sure that the Syrian-Israeli border does not become a stage for another proxy war with Iran. For Turkey, Russia has allowed the country to militarily intervene against Kurdish separatists in northern Syria. It is likely that Turkey will acquiesce to Bashar Al-Assad controlling Syria on the condition that the Kurdish enclave in northern Syria be disbanded.

Because of this, in the event of regime change, Iran is unlikely to realign with the US-Israeli-Gulf axis. Instead, Iran is likely to keep its current alliances and only shift rhetoric. Whether the rhetoric turns more extreme or less will depend on whether the Quds force or the Iranian military take charge after the mullahs.

Trump faces risk in Afghanistan as Putin did in the Ukraine

With the collapse in US-Pakistani relations, Pakistani-Russian reproach risks surrounding Afghanistan with Russian allies, forcing the US into a very uncomfortable position.


President Trump's South Asia strategy is working. The worsening instability in Afghanistan is a byproduct of a successful strategy: if the Taliban and Pakistan weren't worried, the violence would not be at the level of intensity that it is now.

As a result of the South Asia strategy, Indian-US ties are strengthening and Pakistani-US relations are worsening. This re-calibration of US alliances in South Asia is leading Pakistan and Russia - who traditionally have not been allies - into solidifying an alliance that leaves Afghanistan surrounded on all of its borders by Russian-Chinese allies.

This would not normally be an issue - except that, should China and Russia deal the US a defeat in Afghanistan, the US' ability to rival China as a superpower would be threatened in the long-term. Beneath the mountains of Afghanistan are an estimated trillions of dollars-worth of minerals. The minerals in Afghanistan are some of the last major mineral monopolies not held by China. Should the US be driven out of Afghanistan, it would also be driven out of one of the last major mineral monopolies, and its ability to compete economically with China in the future would be seriously challenged.

As in 2011, Pakistan may close off its land and air routes into Afghanistan, leaving the US to take the long route through central Asia. But in 2011, Pakistan relied on a later improvement in US-Pakistani relations. Today, it no longer relies on the US as it has both Russian and Chinese backing. In short, it could close off its land and air routes into Afghanistan indefinitely with less to lose than in 2011.

This makes it easier for Russian/Chinese allies to choke off all supply by sea for Afghanistan. Not only does Afghanistan border Pakistan - it borders central Asian countries to the north, which are closely allied to Russia, and it borders anti-American Iran to the west.

Such a scenario would leave President Donald Trump as hamstrung in Afghanistan as President Putin was in Ukraine in 2014. Like Ukraine for President Putin, Afghanistan is central to American geopolitical interests.

Should supply be held off by all countries bordering Afghanistan, President Trump would be forced into either withdrawal from Afghanistan - which would threaten US interest in Asia - or into forcibly seizing a sea route from one of Afghanistan's neighbours. The more likely choice? President Trump would be more likely to seize a sea route from one of Afghanistan's neighbours and, of the countries which border Afghanistan, Iran is the most likely candidate for US invasion.

Yet like George H. Bush's foreign policy with Iraq, President Trump would not want to invade and occupy all of Iran, as this would inflame tensions between Russia and the US to breaking point. Instead, a limited operation to annex a south-eastern province from Iran would be the ideal strike against the Russian ally. Not only would Afghanistan be able to have access to the sea and Iran's nuclear program be threatened - annexing Iran's south-eastern province would separate Iran from Pakistan. They would no longer border each other.

Such a precision strike by the US would humiliate the Iranian Army - which has long backed the Ayatollah and the Iranian regime - but would also be far easier than regime change, as Iran's south-east is sparsely populated and ethnically close to the Afghans.

It would create tensions between the Iranian Army and State which could be manipulated by the US for years to come. It would aid President Trump in his struggle for Afghanistan, reassure Israel and Middle-East partners of President Trump's willingness to tackle Iran and, crucially, connect Afghanistan to the wider Middle-East.

This risk of President Trump annexing Iran's south-eastern province is vividly similar to President Putin's own annexation of the Crimea from Ukraine. Faced with losing dominance over the Black Sea and less of a buffer between NATO and its own borders, Russian President Vladimir Putin annexed the Crimea from Ukraine to defend its interests against Europe and the US. Given that both Putin and Trump base their foreign policy on putting the needs of their own countries first, in desperation, President Trump is likely to try such a brazen move as Putin did in his own desperation.

With the collapse in US-Pakistani relations, Pakistani-Russian reproach risks surrounding Afghanistan with Russian allies, forcing the US into a very uncomfortable position. But, like Vladimir Putin with Crimea, it would still be likely to go President Trump's way.

Why President Trump is not a war President

Though many of President Trump's political enemies would love him to be painted in such a light, President Trump has shown curious restraint that many other candidates of the 2016 election - both Republican and Democrat - would not have.

The most famous - and frightening - call for war from Presidential candidates of 2016 was for an invasion of Syria against the Russians, to establish a no-fly-zone - something Marco Rubio, Jeb Bush, Lindsey Graham and Hillary Clinton all pushed for in their foreign policy. President Trump, while bombing Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib, Syria, did so as a stunt against North Korea and to keep his foreign policy looking unpredictable.

Nor is it likely that President Trump will go to war with North Korea. Intense diplomatic pressure has been put on North Korea, China and Russia to deal with the threat Pyongyang represents to the region by seeking to acquire nuclear missiles. Contrary to Media narrative, the diplomatic pressure has been highly successful, and President Trump has been able to avoid war on the Korean peninsula while crippling the regime with harsher and harsher sanctions.

With the exception of the war on ISIL, Afghanistan is about the only war President Trump has committed to. This is in line with President Trump's "America First" foreign policy, as a stable Afghanistan not only denies terror safe havens for Al-Qaeda, ISIL and the Taliban - US presence in is also strengthens bilateral relations with India against the growing influence of China, as well as curbs Pakistan's dangerous moves in support of the Taliban.

President Trump seems highly uninterested in starting a war - whether it be against Syria and Russia, North Korea, or even Iran or Pakistan. Trump is more interested in finishing wars - that is, cleaning up the mess left behind by both the Bush and Obama Administrations, namely in Iraq and Afghanistan, and using such nations as platforms from which to shine the hope of democracy into the Middle-East and Asia.

It is such a shock to the world that a US president who acts as Donald Trump does would be more interested in peace than either of his predecessors. But that is the reality: President Trump is interested in stabilizing both Iraq and Afghanistan, followed by turning US focus back home, to make America Great Again and restore the US' reputation globally.