Cold War 2 meets a burning Middle-East

President Trump's policy of blaming China for Coronavirus and harshly criticizing China for its handling of Hong Kong has the intended effect of lighting what has been dubbed a new Cold War. This article will explore the implications of Cold War 2 for the Middle-East.

If you thought the Middle-East was already burning, it is about to burn a whole lot worse. Geopolitical maneuvering in the Middle-East has been showing a distinct trend, and that trend is in favour of Russia. Once China adds its weight to the Middle-East, the United States will be left on the back foot, having allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia but alienating most other players. Here are some predictions for the Middle-East in the advent of a new Cold War with China:



1) China will help Russia sort out the Syrian Civil War. Progress on the Syrian Civil War has stalled thanks to US sanctions on Iran and sanctions on the Syrian government. It has also stalled because of friction between Turkey and Russia. Still fiercely protective of rebel-held Idlib province, Turkey inflicted damage on Iranian and Syrian targets as they approached Turkish observation posts and has not stopped its rhetoric against Bashar Al-Assad.

But once Cold War 2 begins, Syria is a must-win for China and Russia, as it will shore up Sino-Russian power in the Middle-East and deprive the US of any chance of influence there. Very likely, China will use its powers of persuasion to win Turkey over to the Sino-Russian sphere of influence.

2) China will establish cordial relations with Turkey in absence of the US. US-Turkish relations have been steadily deteriorating since President Barrack Obama decided to use PKK-linked Kurds in the US war with ISIS in Syria. Though President Erdogan was initially optimistic of policy change, President Donald Trump continued to back the Kurds in Syria and forced Erdogan to establish ever closer ties with Russia.

As a result, President Erdogan has bought the S-400 missile defense system from Russia, which is incompatible with US military equipment and would likely cause Turkey, in the long-term, to be expelled from NATO. Though the US has threatened Turkey with sanctions, Chinese entry into the Middle-East gives President Erdogan the perfect opportunity to show itself as an independent player: it could keep the S-400 missile defense system and align itself more closely with China. Should Sino-Turkish relations soar, Turkey would not be seen as Russia's pawn but as a partner on an equal playing field with both China and Russia. This would certainly soften the blow of the loss of influence over Syria, as Chinese-Turkish cooperation would greatly frustrate US intentions with Iran, Syria and the wider region.

3) After US withdrawal, Afghanistan will experience terrible civil war. For war-weary Afghanistan, the worst may be yet to come. Although the Taliban has signed an agreement with the United States, it is unlikely the Taliban will in the long-term keep to that agreement: they are likely to do so until the United States is out of Afghanistan, and then they will likely fight to recapture Kabul from what they see as an American puppet.

The Afghan Taliban is backed by Pakistan which, in turn, is backed by China. Expecting the Taliban to stay quiet in Afghanistan is about as likely as expecting Iraq to stay stable after US withdrawal in 2011. And, like Iraq in 2014, Afghanistan is going to become incredibly unstable and overrun. However, the difference is that the Afghan Taliban are backed by the Chinese.

4) Iran and the US might go to war in Iraq. Neither side wants war - but China might help provoke a conflict between the United States and Iran. The only way this could be accomplished would be through exploiting both countries' interests in Iraq. Should Turkey solidify its partnership with China and Russia, this would only help Iran evade US sanctions, which makes war between the two powers more likely. While the United States is extremely unlikely to ever invade Iran, they might go to war in the Persian Gulf or in Iraq, forcing Iraq into its worst conflict yet.

5) Mohammed Bin Salman's Saudi Arabia will implode. A crashing economy, an authoritarian Crown Prince, public ties with Israel - should King Salman Al-Saud die, Mohammed Bin Salman would be the new Saudi king, and the Arabian tribes would very likely break away. This would see the United States occupying eastern Arabia to protect the oilfields, but would leave Mohammed Bin Salman to recapture the rest of Arabia.

For the war against ISIS, this would be devastating, as many tribes in northern and central Arabia are also found in Iraq and Syria. The Arabian tribes would be pulled into the ISIS ideology with even more fervor than has been seen thus far in the Syrian-Iraqi conflict. The frightening scenario of ISIS taking control of Mecca and Medina is no laughing matter, and is a possibility should Saudi Arabia become the latest stage of a proxy war between the United States and China. If China succeeds in winning Turkey over to the Sino-Russian axis, Turkey would likely have no qualms about using ISIS to crush Mohammed Bin Salman. It tried a similar policy in Syria. Such a daring idea could even see Turkish influence expanded to Arabia in the name of fighting ISIS.


Should China engage in the Middle-East to fight in proxy wars with the United States, the whole region would be brought from breaking point to something even worse. Unfortunately for them, the worst of the fighting is definitely yet to come.

The Fracturing of Iran's Shi'ite Crescent

Although the recent sanctions of the US Congress' Caesar Act are targeted against the Syrian Arab Republic, US President Donald Trump's intended targets may be Iraq and Iran.

President Trump has criticized both George W. Bush and Barrack Obama for their handling of Iraq during their presidencies: for George Bush, it was for the initial invasion in 2003; for Barrack Obama it was for the way he withdrew from Iraq in 2011. President Trump has shown a markedly different Iraq policy - one centered on strong, firm support for Iraq while antagonizing Iran.

Previous rounds of sanctions on Iran led by the Trump Administration forced the people of Iraq and Lebanon out in protest against their Iran-backed governments and economic mismanagement. In Lebanon, they have frayed Hezbollah's control and may yet change the political status quo. In Iraq, protests have shocked Iraq's government to its core and, eventually, are likely to inspire regime change more in favour of the autocratic wing of the Middle-East (UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia) and less in favour of Iran. Together with the death of Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani in January this year, things are looking dire for Iran's Shi'ite Crescent.

Due to economic support from China and Russia, sanctions against the Syrian Arab Republic are unlikely to force Bashar Al-Assad out of office or bankrupt his regime. For Iran, however, the already dire economic situation from Tehran to Beirut is made even more so, and is likely to require Iran to make a further strategic withdrawal from the Middle-East.

Iraq is likely where Iran will have to make their concessions first. Increasingly, Baghdad and the Shi'ite Arab south will not be a place welcome for the Shi'ite militias of Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi. Although the militias were popular in their fight against ISIS, Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi have worked hard to make sure that they remain well paid for throughout the sanctions, alienating them from Iraqi protesters who do not share such a luxury.

Should Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi be forced out of Iraq's south, the militias are likely to be sent into the Sunni Arab and Kurdish regions nominally controlled by the Iraqi Army. There the Sunni Arabs and ethnically mixed lands near Kirkuk would be unable to protest their presence as the Shi'ite south has done and, at a pinch, Iran would still be able to make sure its land corridor from Tehran to Beirut remains well protected.

Yet unlike in Iraq, Syrians do not protest the Iran-backed militias. Either they are too frightened to by the apparatus of the Assad regime, or they are grateful for the role the militias played in freeing their country from civil war. As Russia, Turkey and Iran reach a political settlement which solidifies Assad's hold on the nation, this Syrian patriotism for Iran and its proxies is likely to be stirred up even further.

But today, the Shi'ite Arabs of Lebanon and Iraq protest Iranian proxies. After 5-10 more years of US sanctions, it is not hard to see that Hezbollah and Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi might even be forced out of these regions altogether: not by war, but by economic necessity. Intriguingly, once bankrupt, the Iranian proxies of the Arab world might flee to Syria to live in refuge, as the Syrian Arab Republic would be more immune to sanctions due to Sino-Russian support.

The exile of Hezbollah from Lebanon and Hash'd Ash-Sha'bi militias from Iraq may currently seem a remote possibility, but two years ago widespread protests in Lebanon and Iraq against Iran also seemed a remote possibility. President Trump's lasting legacy for the region may indeed be a pro-American Iraq, a defanged Lebanon and a Syria dominated by Iran's proxies.

Why regime change in Iran won't be pro-US

After leading the charge against Communism for 50 years, the Iraq war and the Afghan war, the last thing the American people want is war and occupation of Iran.

Under President Trump, the United States is waging economic war with a variety of nations - from Asian nations China and North Korea to Russia, Turkey and Pakistan. But nowhere is economic war more focused than against Iran.

The objective of sanctions against Iran, according to President Trump - and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu - is to get a new deal to replace the previous Iran Deal negotiated by Barrack Obama. However, should Iran Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei not comply, the Iranian economy will continue to erode and regime change will be inevitable.

Yet there is no chance Iran will erupt in civil war. Though the Iranian people are frustrated with the current regime, they are more terrified of instability than of Khamenei and the mullahs. Seeing instability in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Libya is the main reason for this.

Like in 1979, the next Iranian revolution will not be bloody. There are two alternatives, and neither of them would be pro-United States.

The first alternative is that Qassem Suleimani will become the next leader of Iran. Should Iranian protests grow and Ali Khamenei order the Quds force to fire on civilians, it is possible that Suleimani will claim Khamanei has lost his Islamic legitimacy and take control of Tehran. Should that occur, it would be a nightmare for the US, Israel and their allies.

The second alternative is that the Iranian army will engage in a military coup against the Iranian regime and take control of Tehran. Military coups are common in the Middle-East, with the most recent one taking place in Egypt in 2013.

In either scenario, relations between Russia and Iran would strengthen and the US would not be able to make inroads. The Middle-East is well aware that the United States has had an incompetent track record in its foreign policy in the region - conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria were all exacerbated by American idealism over any real interest to engage with regional issues.

The most recent example of this would be the United States still calling for a return to the Geneva talks in the Syrian conflict, though Geneva has proven much less successful than the Russia-backed Astana and Sochi talks.

On the other hand, Russia is on the ascendancy in the Middle-East because it has largely cooperated with regional actors and sought the best for each nation on balance. For Syria, Iran, Turkey and Israel, Russia under President Putin has engaged in delicate diplomacy to provide the best needs for each regional actor in the context of the Syrian crisis. First and foremost, it has restored control of Syria to the Syrian Arab Army and has cleared out the majority of the region from ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

For Israel, Russia has made sure that the Syrian-Israeli border does not become a stage for another proxy war with Iran. For Turkey, Russia has allowed the country to militarily intervene against Kurdish separatists in northern Syria. It is likely that Turkey will acquiesce to Bashar Al-Assad controlling Syria on the condition that the Kurdish enclave in northern Syria be disbanded.

Because of this, in the event of regime change, Iran is unlikely to realign with the US-Israeli-Gulf axis. Instead, Iran is likely to keep its current alliances and only shift rhetoric. Whether the rhetoric turns more extreme or less will depend on whether the Quds force or the Iranian military take charge after the mullahs.

Trump faces risk in Afghanistan as Putin did in the Ukraine

With the collapse in US-Pakistani relations, Pakistani-Russian reproach risks surrounding Afghanistan with Russian allies, forcing the US into a very uncomfortable position.


President Trump's South Asia strategy is working. The worsening instability in Afghanistan is a byproduct of a successful strategy: if the Taliban and Pakistan weren't worried, the violence would not be at the level of intensity that it is now.

As a result of the South Asia strategy, Indian-US ties are strengthening and Pakistani-US relations are worsening. This re-calibration of US alliances in South Asia is leading Pakistan and Russia - who traditionally have not been allies - into solidifying an alliance that leaves Afghanistan surrounded on all of its borders by Russian-Chinese allies.

This would not normally be an issue - except that, should China and Russia deal the US a defeat in Afghanistan, the US' ability to rival China as a superpower would be threatened in the long-term. Beneath the mountains of Afghanistan are an estimated trillions of dollars-worth of minerals. The minerals in Afghanistan are some of the last major mineral monopolies not held by China. Should the US be driven out of Afghanistan, it would also be driven out of one of the last major mineral monopolies, and its ability to compete economically with China in the future would be seriously challenged.

As in 2011, Pakistan may close off its land and air routes into Afghanistan, leaving the US to take the long route through central Asia. But in 2011, Pakistan relied on a later improvement in US-Pakistani relations. Today, it no longer relies on the US as it has both Russian and Chinese backing. In short, it could close off its land and air routes into Afghanistan indefinitely with less to lose than in 2011.

This makes it easier for Russian/Chinese allies to choke off all supply by sea for Afghanistan. Not only does Afghanistan border Pakistan - it borders central Asian countries to the north, which are closely allied to Russia, and it borders anti-American Iran to the west.

Such a scenario would leave President Donald Trump as hamstrung in Afghanistan as President Putin was in Ukraine in 2014. Like Ukraine for President Putin, Afghanistan is central to American geopolitical interests.

Should supply be held off by all countries bordering Afghanistan, President Trump would be forced into either withdrawal from Afghanistan - which would threaten US interest in Asia - or into forcibly seizing a sea route from one of Afghanistan's neighbours. The more likely choice? President Trump would be more likely to seize a sea route from one of Afghanistan's neighbours and, of the countries which border Afghanistan, Iran is the most likely candidate for US invasion.

Yet like George H. Bush's foreign policy with Iraq, President Trump would not want to invade and occupy all of Iran, as this would inflame tensions between Russia and the US to breaking point. Instead, a limited operation to annex a south-eastern province from Iran would be the ideal strike against the Russian ally. Not only would Afghanistan be able to have access to the sea and Iran's nuclear program be threatened - annexing Iran's south-eastern province would separate Iran from Pakistan. They would no longer border each other.

Such a precision strike by the US would humiliate the Iranian Army - which has long backed the Ayatollah and the Iranian regime - but would also be far easier than regime change, as Iran's south-east is sparsely populated and ethnically close to the Afghans.

It would create tensions between the Iranian Army and State which could be manipulated by the US for years to come. It would aid President Trump in his struggle for Afghanistan, reassure Israel and Middle-East partners of President Trump's willingness to tackle Iran and, crucially, connect Afghanistan to the wider Middle-East.

This risk of President Trump annexing Iran's south-eastern province is vividly similar to President Putin's own annexation of the Crimea from Ukraine. Faced with losing dominance over the Black Sea and less of a buffer between NATO and its own borders, Russian President Vladimir Putin annexed the Crimea from Ukraine to defend its interests against Europe and the US. Given that both Putin and Trump base their foreign policy on putting the needs of their own countries first, in desperation, President Trump is likely to try such a brazen move as Putin did in his own desperation.

With the collapse in US-Pakistani relations, Pakistani-Russian reproach risks surrounding Afghanistan with Russian allies, forcing the US into a very uncomfortable position. But, like Vladimir Putin with Crimea, it would still be likely to go President Trump's way.

Why President Trump is not a war President

Though many of President Trump's political enemies would love him to be painted in such a light, President Trump has shown curious restraint that many other candidates of the 2016 election - both Republican and Democrat - would not have.

The most famous - and frightening - call for war from Presidential candidates of 2016 was for an invasion of Syria against the Russians, to establish a no-fly-zone - something Marco Rubio, Jeb Bush, Lindsey Graham and Hillary Clinton all pushed for in their foreign policy. President Trump, while bombing Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib, Syria, did so as a stunt against North Korea and to keep his foreign policy looking unpredictable.

Nor is it likely that President Trump will go to war with North Korea. Intense diplomatic pressure has been put on North Korea, China and Russia to deal with the threat Pyongyang represents to the region by seeking to acquire nuclear missiles. Contrary to Media narrative, the diplomatic pressure has been highly successful, and President Trump has been able to avoid war on the Korean peninsula while crippling the regime with harsher and harsher sanctions.

With the exception of the war on ISIL, Afghanistan is about the only war President Trump has committed to. This is in line with President Trump's "America First" foreign policy, as a stable Afghanistan not only denies terror safe havens for Al-Qaeda, ISIL and the Taliban - US presence in is also strengthens bilateral relations with India against the growing influence of China, as well as curbs Pakistan's dangerous moves in support of the Taliban.

President Trump seems highly uninterested in starting a war - whether it be against Syria and Russia, North Korea, or even Iran or Pakistan. Trump is more interested in finishing wars - that is, cleaning up the mess left behind by both the Bush and Obama Administrations, namely in Iraq and Afghanistan, and using such nations as platforms from which to shine the hope of democracy into the Middle-East and Asia.

It is such a shock to the world that a US president who acts as Donald Trump does would be more interested in peace than either of his predecessors. But that is the reality: President Trump is interested in stabilizing both Iraq and Afghanistan, followed by turning US focus back home, to make America Great Again and restore the US' reputation globally.

US-Russian reproach to follow Pakistan debacle?

The US needs a stable route into Afghanistan.

More important for the US than economic security for their mission in Afghanistan - which is what Pakistan has provided for the US over the last 16 years - is regional security. Pakistan has continued to show that it is unwilling to give up on its dangerous foreign policy, which allows US troops to use Pakistan as a base while also funding the very Taliban the US are trying to destroy.

Should Pakistani-US relations continue to sour - as seems highly likely under the Trump Administration - the US will be forced to use the more expensive Central Asia route. The route through Central Asia forces the US to deal with its strained relations with Moscow, for to have access to Central Asia requires Russian approval.

The US would likely be able to reach common ground on Afghanistan with the Kremlin, as Moscow is in no position currently to tackle the jihad threat in that region, but thorny issues like Ukraine and Syria present a difficulty for the two world powers. One sure way to ease tensions between Washington and Moscow would be for the Trump Administration to tacitly approve the political process in Syria, allow Bashar Al-Assad to stay in power and stop the rhetoric of regime change.

Such thawing of Russian-US relations also has the potential to drive a wedge between Russia and China, as Russia is far more concerned about the rising terror threat in the region than its counterpart in Beijing. China sees Pakistan and its foreign policy as advantageous to holding back India and gaining leverage over mineral reserves in Afghanistan. Though Russia has also been eying those mineral reserves, the Kremlin is aware that mineral monopoly is not worth risking instability and terrorism for the Russian Federation.

Given President Trump's long held view that he would get along well with President Putin, it is time for a thawing of relations between the two world powers regarding Afghanistan. Otherwise the US will be unable to achieve the results it desires for Afghanistan and the South Asia region.

Trump's Afghanistan Strategy is an Asia Strategy

In late August President Donald Trump recommitted US forces to Afghanistan, to defeat the Taliban and to help the US achieve military victory there as part of his South Asia strategy. But President Trump's strategy represents more than victory over the Taliban, and has implications even larger than just South Asia. President Trump's strategy in Afghanistan is an integral part of a successful US pivot towards Asia.

President Trump is using his strategy in Afghanistan to reshape US alliances in Asia. In President Trump's speech, rhetoric against Pakistan was made harsher and an invitation was extended for India to invest more fully in Afghanistan. The US has calculated that in Asia, India is an essential long-term ally and will thus receive the lion's share of benefits from Afghanistan at the expense of Pakistan. The US is turning the Afghan War into a proxy war between India and Pakistan, a proxy war that India is likely to invest in victory for.

As a result of this policy, US-Pakistani relations are deteriorating. This gives India the reassurance they need that they will be a highly prized US ally and will be able to commit long-term to the US over other geopolitical contenders, such as Russia. Pakistan, on the other hand, will be forced to rely more exclusively on China and Russia and, given Pakistani links to terrorism, Pakistan will taint Russian and Chinese reputations in Asia.

The geopolitical calculation of the Trump Administration is that together, the US and India are a powerhouse which can match growing Chinese influence. Victory in Afghanistan would see an enormous economic boost for India and the US, and would allow both countries to rely less on China for unearthing rare minerals. Estimates put the minerals in Afghanistan as worth trillions of dollars, and securing those resources with a government in Afghanistan friendly to India and the US would mean that India and the US would compete with China in the minerals' monopoly.

The South Asia strategy, together with harsher measures on North Korea and more open US-Taiwanese relations, sees a US that is pivoting away from quagmires in the Middle-East and towards Asia. In a stronger Indian-US alliance cemented in Afghanistan, China is finally faced with a worthy adversary.